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I. Introduction
One of the most salient features of the creation of the European
Community (EC or Community) was the establishment of a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) for all Member States.1 Over the years, it has
proved to be the most integrated and consistent of all the common
policies. Although the establishment of a common commercial policy
in other areas presents a poor record, with regard to agriculture not
only is there a real common commercial policy, but for many years
there was also a reasonable degree of cohesion among Member States.2
1 According to Article 38(4) of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, Mar. 25, 1957 (Treaty of Rome), "the functioning and development of the Common
Market for agriculture products shall be accompanied by the establishment of a common
agricultural policy among the Member States." Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 38(4),
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 30. The objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and
by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the opti-
mum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour;
(b) to ensure thereby a fair standard of living for the agricultural community,
particularly by the increasing of the individual earnings of persons engaged in
agriculture;
(c) to stabilise markets;
(d) to guarantee regular supplies; and
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
Id. at 30-31.
The bibliography on the CAP is immense. See, e.g., RosEMARY FENNELL, THE COMMON
AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrI': Irs INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANISATION (1979); BRIAN E. HiLL, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLIcY'. PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE (1984); J. RAUX, POLrrQUE AGRICOLE COMMUNE ET CONSTRUCTION COM-
MUNAUTAIRE (1984); FRANCts G. SNYDER, LAW OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL PoLIcv (1985).
2 See Robert Pourvoyeur & Paul Roosens, Reflexions autour du caractre commun de la poli-
tique commerciale d l'exportation de la CEE, 293 REVUE DU MARCHE COMUN 26 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter R.M.C.]. In connection with the establishment of a common commercial policy in other
sectors see, e.g., PABLO BENAVIDES SALAS, LA POLmCA COMERCIAL COMUN (1986);Jacques H.
J. Bourgeois, The Common Commercial Policy: Scope and Nature of the Powers, in PROTECIONISM
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1 (E.L.M. Volker ed., 2d ed. 1987); Paul Demaret, Lapolitique
commerciale: perspectives d'ivolution etfaibsses prisentes, in STRucrTURE AND DIMENSIONS OF EURO-
PAN CoMMUNITY PoLIcY 69 (Jirgen Schwarze & Henry G. Shermers eds., 1988); Gilsdorf,
Portie et dilimitation des compences communautaires en mattire de politique commerciale, 326 R.M.C.
195 (1989); Collette Neme, 1992 et la clause de l'art. 115: A quand une politique commerciale
commune?, 322 R.M.C. 578 (1988); Samus O'Cleireacdin, Europe 1992 and Gaps in the EC's
Common Commercial Policy, 28J. COMMON MKr. STUD. 201 (1990); George N. Yannopoulos,
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The importance of agriculture for the EC is readily understood by
looking at the Official Journals and the annual budgets: Between two-
thirds and three-quarters of the legal acts published deal with agricul-
ture, which accounts for nearly three-quarters of the entire budget.3
The CAP has had dramatic success in increasing agricultural pro-
ductivity and assuring the availability of supplies. Although in the
1960s Europe was basically a food importer zone, today the EC is the
second largest exporter of farm products in the world. The scheme
based on the use of variable levies to prevent imports and export re-
funds to foster exports proved to be very successful for the Community
at a time when it was a net importer of farm products. Nonetheless,
the effects of this scheme on world markets have given rise to a grow-
ing number of disputes between the Community and its trading part-
ners, notably the United States. During the 1980s, the Community
became a net exporter of agricultural products4 while a record
number of U.S. farmers were filing for bankruptcy. Although the
causal relationship between the EC's growing exports and the corre-
sponding decline of U.S. exports is much discussed, the United States
has blamed the EC for having stolen its markets. A war of subsidies
and other protectionist measures between the EC and the United
States has ensued, becoming the most thorny issue of the bilateral rela-
tionships between the two blocks and putting into question the credi-
bility of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT or
General Agreement) 5 as a legal system.
A first step directed at restoring this credibility was the inclusion
of agriculture within the agenda of the Uruguay Round multilateral
trade negotiations. 6 However, the irreconcilable differences between
the EC and the United States in connection with the reduction of pub-
lic support to farmers has stalled the talks, leading the negotiations to
The EC's Common External Commercial Polity: Internal Contradictions and Institutional Weaknesses,
19J. WoRLD TRADE L. 451 (1985).
3 See Graham Avery, The Common Agricultural Policy: A Turning Point, 21 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 481, 482 (1984).
4 See ORGANISATION DE COOPERATION ET DE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUES, POLrrIQuEs
NATIONALES ET ECHANcEs AGRicoLEs: ETUDE SUR LA CRE 161 (1987) (hereinafter OCDE].
5 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. (5) & (6), 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATr]. On GATT, see DOMINIQUE CARREAU ET
AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE (3d ed. 1990); KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAw
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); THmIEBAULT FLORY, LE GATT, DRorr IN-
TERNATIONAL ET COMMERCE MONDIAL (1968); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT
SYST.M (1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYsrEM (1989); JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LE.AL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1986); OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMrrA-
TIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1985); EDMOND McGoVwRN, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE REGULATION (1986).
6 The Uruguay Round is the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations held
within the GATT institutional milieu. It was launched in Punta del Este (Uruguay) in Sep-
tember 1986. See Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este, 33 Basic Instruments and Selected
Documents (GATT) 19 (1987) [hereinafter B.I.S.D.].
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a halt. Everyone wonders why a sector that represents a very small part
of the Gross Domestic Product of both the EC and the United States
could have caused the collapse of the Uruguay Round-and many an-
swers have been offered from a wide array of different perspectives.
This Article tries to contribute to this debate. The Article applies
one of the newest methodologies designed to study international coop-
eration-the integration of interational law and international rela-
tions theory-to an event of outstanding importance to world
commerce: the agricultural export subsidies dispute between the
United States and the EC. As made evident in the last meeting of the
American Society of International Law, by combining the theoretical
diversity of international relations theory with the doctrinal tradition
of international law, this methodology provides a rejuvenated insight
into the study of world trade regulation. Although "it has been diffi-
cult to tell for the last twenty years that the two disciplines were even
talking about the same world,"17 a number of efforts have been
launched recently, aimed at reintegrating international law and inter-
national relations.
From this perspective, the Article will review the evolution of the
rules since the inception of GATT in 1947 until the most recent pro-
posals submitted within the Uruguay Round negotiations. Part II in-
troduces some of the theories provided by both international lawyers
and international political scientists to explain the functioning of the
international trade regime. It also examines the original rules of the
General Agreement and the legality of EC agricultural export subsidies
against this theoretical framework. Part III analyzes the Code on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Duties drafted during the Tokyo Round and
its functioning in practice. Part IV examines the role of the Uruguay
Round as the first attempt to subject agricultural policies to the GATT
regime, and it portrays the factors that have led to the collapse of the
Round. Part V concerns the "Agreement on Agriculture" proposed by
the GATT Director General in December 1991. It delineates the pros-
pects for the proposed agreement on the basis of the theoretical
framework provided in Part II and empirical data available to date.
The conclusions, set out in Part VI, argue that the compatibility with
GATT of the agricultural export subsidies granted by the EC should
not be examined in strict legal terms.
The EC/U.S. agricultural subsidy dispute is best understood by
adding insights from international relations theory to existing legal
analyses. The nature of the international trade regime installed after
World War II is best appreciated in this light. Put in this perspective,
7 Kenneth W. Abbot, Elements of a Joint Discipline, in International Law and International
Relations Theoy: Building Bridges, 1992 Am. Soc'v INT'L L.: PROC. OF 86TH ANN. MEETING 167.
The merits of this methodology were defended by legal scholars such as Harold H. Koh and
Kenneth W. Abbott and by international political scientists such as Robert 0. Keohane and
Oran R. Young, in a meeting held on April 2, 1992. See id.
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one can argue that the effectiveness of the norms regulating the use of
subsidies has depended on the degree to which the legal rules em-
braced the commercial interests of the most relevant actors. The core
conclusion of the Article is that the current round of multilateral trade
negotiations will be successfully completed and will have a legitimizing
effect on GATT rules on agriculture.
II. Common Agricultural Policy and the International Trade
Regime: Some Ironies
A. An International Law/International Relations View of the
International Trade Regime
Contemporary international economic interdependence is an im-
mediate consequence of the success of the so-called Bretton Woods
System, embodied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank, and GATT.8 Since its entry into force on January 1,
1948,9 GATT has become "the centerpiece of a solar system of in-
dependent agreements" 10 which have come to regulate international
commerce on a worldwide basis. The functioning of GATT within the
international trade realm has been studied from different disciplines,
which have provided distinct and complementary explanations. A
comprehensive understanding of GATT's role as the central institution
for the regulation of international trade would require an interdiscipli-
nary approach" that could benefit from the insights provided by fields
such as law, economics, and political science. With this idea in mind,
this Article examines the agricultural export subsidies dispute between
the EC and the United States cutting across the domains of interna-
tional law and international political science. When appropriate, the
analysis will be enriched with ideas borrowed from other disciplines in
order to contribute to a better understanding of the underpinnings of
GATT regulation on agricultural subsidies.
8 Although strictly speaking the "Bretton Woods System" encompasses only the IMF
and the World Bank, Jackson also includes the CATT. JACKSON & DAVEv, supra note 5, at 2,
282.
9 Technically speaking, "the basic treaty comprising the GATT has never come into
force, being applied through a 1947 'Protocol of Provisional Application.'" [hereinafter
P.PA.]. JACKSON, RESTRUCrURING THE GATT SwsTEM, supra note 5, at 1. The Contracting
Parties have considered the definitive application of GATT several times, but so far they have
never reached an agreement. See generally Marc Hansen & Edwin Vermulst, The GATTProtocol
of Provisional Application: A Dying Grandfather?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (1989);
Frieder Roessler, The Provisional Application of the GATT, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 289 (1985)
(discussing the P.P.A.).
The Contracting Parties decided to act under the P.P.A. instead of waiting for GATT to
come into force because, among other reasons, the negotiation mandate granted by Con-
gress to the President was to expire in 1948. JACKSON, THE WoRLD TRADING SSTEM, supra
note 5, at 35.
10 R. Michael Gadbaw, The Outlook for GATT as an Institution, in MANAGING TRADE RELA-
TIONS IN THE 1980s 33, 36 (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1983).
11 JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 1.
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International political scientists view GATT as an international re-
gime of "networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize be-
havior and control its effects." 12 Whether international regimes affect
state behavior and practices has been the subject of extensive debate.
Although the Realists hold that state action in the international do-
main is an exercise of power politics, 13 the Institutionalists14 and the
proponents of the Functional Theory of International Regimes 15 argue
that international regimes do have effects on state behavior. Some
scholars have studied GATT's salient features as an international trade
regime, and have drawn some conclusions as to the causes of the re-
gime's change and its impact on state behavior.16 In connection with
regime change, the most salient model is the theory of hegemonic sta-
bility.1 7 In short, the two central propositions of this theory are that
"the formation of international regimes normally depends on hegem-
ony," and that "the maintenance of order requires continued hegem-
ony."' 8 As applied to international trade, the theory "specifies that
12 ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 19 (1977).
A conference of international relations scholars held in Los Angeles in 1980 accepted
the following definition of "regime":
A regime is composed of sets of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in
a given area of international relations and which may help to coordinate their
behavior.
1. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.
2. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of general rights and
obligations.
3. Rules are specific prescriptions and proscriptions regarding behavior.
4. Decision-making procedures are the prevailing practices for making and
implementing collective choices.
Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime
Dynamics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 273, 275 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
The concept of "international regime" was first applied within the domain of political
science by John Ruggie. SeeJohn G. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and
Trends, 29 Int'l Org. 557 (1975). From then on, it was widely adopted as a theoretical con-
struction which tries to explain cooperative behavior among states in different issue-areas.
See generally Helen Milner, International Theories of Cooperation among Nations, 44 WORLD POL.
466 (1992) (reviewing the most recent theories of cooperation among nations).
13 See, e.g., HANSJ. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS
(6th ed. 1985).
14 See DAVID MiTRANY, THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICS (1975). Although these
scholars often adopt the label of "Functionalists," Robert 0. Keohane labels them "Institu-
tionalists" "because of [their] adherents emphasis on the functions performed by interna-
tional institutions," and to avoid confusion with the "Functional Theory of International
Regimes" presented in his book. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 17, 85-109 (1984).
15 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 14, at 85-109.
16 See, e.g., KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 14, 135-240; Finlayson & Zacher,
supra note 12; Charles Lipson, The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime
Change, 36 INT'L ORG. 417 (1982), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 233 (Stephen D. Kras-
ner ed., 1983).
17 See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929-1939 (1973).
18 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 14, at 31. The second tenet of the theory has
been criticized by Keohane, who argues that "cooperation does not necessarily require the
existence of a hegemonic leader after international regimes have been established. Post-
hegemonic cooperation is also possible." Id. at 32.
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stable, open international economic structures are causally associated
with a hegemonic distribution of state power."19 Hence this model
would explain the changes that have occurred in the world trading
system by the decline of American hegemony during the last decades.
Although the theory has been widely accepted, its validity with regard
to the international trade regime has been challenged on different
grounds. Some authors have observed an uneven timing between the
American decline and the major changes occurring within the interna-
tional trade regime. 20 Others have denied the causal relationship and
have concluded that "the theory is inadequate because of its failure to
take into account the role of international institutions, such as interna-
tional economic regimes, in fostering and shaping patterns of
cooperation."21
In response to the hegemonic model, Robert Keohane presented
the Functional Theory of International Regimes, according to which
international regimes perform valuable functions.22 For example, in-
ternational regimes provide an important source of information, re-
duce the costs of legitimate transactions, and facilitate negotiations
among governments. They legitimate and delegitimate distinct types
of state action and provide incentives for compliance. 23 In addition,
"the regime-eroding effects of hegemonic decline are to some extent
counterbalanced by the value to governments of rules that limit
player's [sic] legitimate strategies and therefore reduce uncertainty in
the world political economy." 24 Others have reduced the functions
performed by the GATT regime to four interrelated categories: the
"facilitative" function, the "constraint" function, the "diffusion of influ-
ence" function, and the "promotion of interaction" function.25 The
first function is best illustrated by the seven rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations held within GATIT's institutional milieu. 26 With re-
gard to the third function, they argue that "the existence of the GATT
regulatory-consultative framework has given smaller regime members a
greater opportunity to pursue their interests than would have been the
case had no regime for this issue come into being."2 7 The fourth func-
19 Lipson, supra note 16, at 437.
20 In light of this observation, Lipson has concluded that "the model can be criticized
... on the grounds that its predictions are only roughly accurate and that its causal links are
not always compelling." Id.
21 See, e.g., KEoHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 14, at 215.
22 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 14, at 85-109.
23 Id. at 107-108, 244-245.
24 Id. at 195.
25 See Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 12, at 310.
26 Id. at 310-311. As already noted, the Uruguay Round is the eighth round of multilat-
eral trade negotiations. The other rounds were: Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Tourquay
(1950), Geneva (1956), Dillon (1961). Kennedy (1962-67), and Tokyo (1973-79). SeeJAcK-
SON, REsTRuCrURING THE GATT SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 37.
27 Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 12, at 313. This argument, if not stretched too far,
seems plausible in light of the numerous measures adopted to the advantage of developing
1993]
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ion, which is a consequence of the success of the other three func-
tions, is the "promotion of interaction." Since the basic economic
objective of the GATT is the expansion of international trade to the
benefit of all states, the type of "interaction" that is "promoted" is trade
exchanges.28 To these four functions, one could easily add what could
be labeled the "appeasement of domestic pressures" function. Ample
evidence suggests that a tough international trade regime is a good
instrument to appease domestic pressure groups.29 In the case of
GATT, however, this ability has been inhibited because the courts of
most Contracting Parties do not give direct effect to its provisions.
These classifications are obviously as arbitrary as any other classifi-
cation, and one could find evidence either to support or to challenge
some of these functions. Because it is central to the theme of this Arti-
cle and it has been identified by numerous scholars,30 it is worth ana-
lyzing the second function in some detail: the so-called "constraint"
function. The ability of a regime to perform this function will largely
depend on the effectiveness of the norms of the agreements on which
the regime stands. Thus, an appraisal of the "constraint" function of
international regimes necessitates a legal analysis of the elements that
ensure the effectiveness of a set of norms.
From a legal perspective, it can be argued that international trade
norms, like all kinds of norms, aim at influencing the behavior of the
subjects to whom the norms are addressed. In New Haven School ter-
minology, "rules or norms formulate shared or community expecta-
tions as to how those to whom a norm is addressed will behave."31
Regardless of their form or origin, they reflect the desirability of attain-
ing a goal and direct the subjects of the norms to that end. In short,
norms determine "what ought to be."32 As long as they succeed in the
realization of "what ought to be," "one speaks of the effectiveness of
(the normative force of) the norm."33
A primary question is how to measure the effectiveness of any set
of norms. It seems that the effectiveness (normative force) of a legal
system must be judged by analyzing what would have happened in the
absence of such a system.34 The general observance of the rules is not
countries, such as the formal recognition of a "different and special" treatment in many
GATT agreements.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., ERNST-ULRicH PETERSMANN, CONSTrrUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw (1991).
30 See Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 12, at 311-312; KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 12, at
51.
31 Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms-A Meaningful Distinction in International
Relations, 1980 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 65, 66 (footnote omitted).
32 Pieter van Dijk, Normative Force and Effectiveness ofInternational Norms, 1987 GERM. Y.B.
INT'L L. 9, 9.
33 Id.
34 Jeffrey M. Waincymer, GATT Dispute Settlement: An Agenda for Evaluation and Reform,
14 N.C.J. Irr'L L. & COM. REG. 81, 91 (1989).
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definitive proof that the rules have been effective because a possibility
exists that in the absence of the norms states would have behaved the
same. We say that the norms are effective if states adopt a course of
action because of the norm. Thus, "we understand by normative force
the effect of a norm directed at influencing behaviour." 35
The normative force of international trade norms depends in part
on the willingness of international subjects to abide by the rules. "This
willingness may be prompted by the legitimacy which the norm, and/
or the system of norms of which this norm forms a part, enjoys in the
eyes of the addressee."3 6 The more legitimate a country regards a set
of norms, the more it will be willing to behave according to those
norms. It follows that, to ensure the effectiveness of a legal system,
account must be taken of the factors bearing on its legitimacy. The
identification of these factors is not an easy task. Following Professor
Pieter van Dijk's footprints, some of these factors can be mentioned
here.
First, the legitimacy of the norm depends on "the way in which the
norm has been created and formulated."37 In the context of GATT,
for example, the legitimacy of the norms, which were shaped to serve
the commercial goals of a handful of states, may be challenged by
those countries that joined the regime at a later stage, claiming that
the norms do not take into account their specific commercial interests.
As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann has noted, "the efficiency of international
economic regulations is dependent upon the taking into account of
the interests of the respective addressees and of their consent to the
policy measures (interest realization, consensus principle, maximiza-
tion of self-interest)."38 In fact, states normally comply with treaties
because they are reflective of their interests. In Professor Chayes'
words, "the basic principle of classical international law that states can-
not be legally bound except with their own consent tends to make the
rules they are obligated to carry out reflective of their interests."3 9
Another factor which has an important bearing on the legitimacy
of a set of norms is "the consensus on values underlying the norms."40
When this consensus is incomplete, states may reach an agreement on
a principle. "The negotiators [are] able to agree on the desirability of
35 van Dijk, supra note 32, at 16.
36 Id. In Professor van Dijk's words, "legitimacy is the value or authority which the ad-
dressee attributes to a norm and/or to the system of norms to which this particular norm
belongs." Id.
37 Id.
38 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Theory and International Economic Law:
On the Tasks of a Legal Theory of International Economic Order, in THE ST'RUaruiRE AND PROcEss OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 227, 230 (R. St. J. Macdonald & D. M. Johnston eds., 1983) (footnote
omitted).
39 Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, On Compliance 7 (1992) (unpublished draft
text of a study on compliance with international treaty obligations, on file with the author).
40 van Dijk, supra note 32, at 16.
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attaining a goal but not on the instruments to be used to reach the
goal."41 Principles may turn into rules if a strong consensus exists at a
later time.42 If rules are formulated before such consensus exists,
problems are likely to crop up if one tries to enforce them. Additional
difficulties may arise if the drafting of a norm is not clear, and its real
nature is discussed. "If a provision is taken by some as an agreement
on a principle and by others as a prescription of conduct it inevitably
widens the gap between expectation and fulfillment, which is the
source of all conflict."43 For a variety of reasons, sometimes interna-
tional negotiations give rise to rules in spite of the lack of consensus on
the values underlying such rules. In these instances, the life of these
rules is likely to be very troublesome.
The legitimacy also depends on "the expectation that the compli-
ance with the norm will be enforced by sanctions." 44 Whether institu-
tionalized or unilateral, the availability of sanctions may have a
deterrent effect on potential deviators. International political scien-
tists argue that "'tit for tat' is a more effective strategy to induce coop-
eration than submissiveness."45 In addition, it is widely acknowledged
that the effectiveness of a legal system depends largely on the availabil-
ity of a mechanism to enforce the rules, and the authority of the body
established to perform such a task. This body is typically in charge of
supervising whether states behave according to the rules (review func-
tion), restoring the harmony between prescribed conduct and behavior
(correction function), and "clariffying] and further specif[ying the] norms
to which the interpretation and application of norms lead (creative
function).-46
The purpose of the following sections is to analyze the regulation
of the General Agreement against the theoretical framework provided
above. The idea is to examine the way in which the norms on subsidies
were created, especially the role played by both the United States and
the EC; the eventual consensus underlying the rules; and their func-
tioning in practice. This may shed some light as to how the GATT
regime performed its functions before the Tokyo Round.
41 Frieder Roessler, Law, De Facto Agreements and Declarations of Principle in International
Economic Relations, 1978 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 27, 57.
42 See id. The reverse is also true. "[N]orms originally intended to regulate conduct
gradually begin to operate like principles." Id. at 58.
43 Id.
44 van Dijk, supra note 32, at 16.
45 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 14, at 104. See also Judith L. Goldstein &
Stephen D. Krasner, Unfair Trade Practices: The Case for a Differential Response, 74 Am. ECON.
Rav. 281 (1984).
46 van Dijk, supra note 32, at 27; see also PIETER VAN DIJv, SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS IN
INrERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS (1984) (discussing the review, correction and crea-
tive functions of these bodies in the context of international economic organizations).
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B. The Origin of GAYT Rules on Agriculture
The most striking irony in connection with U.S. complaints about
the ineffectiveness of GATT rules dealing with agriculture is that when
these rules were drafted, they were designed to suit the interests of
U.S. farmers. "The GATT rules were written to fit the agricultural pro-
grams then in existence, especially in the United States."47 Thus to
understand the original GATT rules on agriculture it is necessary to
give a short overview of the roots of U.S. agricultural policies.
For a number of reasons, 48 agriculture has traditionally been a
sector protected by most governments. In the 1930s, some Western
countries, namely the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Den-
mark, intervened heavily in agricultural markets to protect their farm-
ers from the crisis of the mid-1920s.49 The United States also laid the
foundations for its agricultural policies in this period,50 relying heavily
on import quotas, production control programs, price supports, ex-
port subsidies, and the like. As Goldstein has noted, "by mandating a
policy that dictated the use of import quotas and export subsidies in-
stead of one based on reciprocal tariff negotiations without benefit of
government supports, the United States established a precedent for
excluding agriculture from the worldwide liberalization trend that fol-
lowed World War II."51 In the mid-1940s, when discussions for the in-
clusion of agriculture within the scope of the stillborn International
Trade Organization were underway, the U.S. delegation "recognized
that the U.S. Senate would not ratify an international agreement that
would have forced the United States to dismantle its agricultural pro-
gram or which would have made its programs inoperable." 52 Thus, in
spite of the strong opposition from some countries, namely Australia
and a number of developing countries, GATT incorporated special
rules for agriculture. 53 As various commentators have noted, "it is
47 DALE E. HATHAWAv, AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT: RwRrrNG ThE RuLES 104 (1987).
48 Some of the arguments used to explain agricultural protectionism are the desire to
ensure self-sufficiency in agricultural products, environmental concerns, the desire to keep
people living in the countryside, the political power of farm lobbies, and the need to protect
farmers from price fluctuations and adverse weather conditions. See, e.g., Eduardo Moyano
Estrada, Una aproximacidn sociopoltica al proteccionismo en la agricultura, 666 INFORMACION
COMERCiAL ESPANOLA 163 (1989) [hereinafter I.C.E.]; Barcelo Vila, La reducci6n del proteccion-
ismo agrario: Exigencia del sistema y deseabilidad social, 666 I.C.E. 22 (1989).
49 See.MICHAEL TRACY, GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE 1880-1988
119-211 (1989).
50 "[Flive laws passed in the 1930s have structured agriculture policy in the United
States. These are the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the Soil Conservation and Domes-
tic Allotment Act of 1936, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938, and the act creating the Commodity Credit Corporation."
Judith L. Goldstein, The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural and
Manufacturing Policies, 43 INT'L ORG. 31, 44-45 (1989).
51 Id. at 48.
52 HATHAWAY, supra note 47, at 103.
53 See id. at 103-104. As Hathaway points out, "[nlot only did agriculture receive special
treatment in the GATT, but the special treatment also appears to have been tailored to the
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ironic that three decades later these special exceptions for agriculture
would become the major focus of the U.S. government's efforts to
change the rules in the current GATT negotiations."54
As far as the regulation of subsidies is concerned, the original text
of the General Agreement, now embodied in Article XVI, included
only an obligation of notification, and a duty to hold consultations
with other Contracting Parties to discuss the possibility of limiting sub-
sidization. 55 The soft language of this Article, the lack of an efficient
mechanism to control its observance, and the absence qf a definition
of subsidy limit the usefulness of the provision. When the Contracting
Parties met in 1955 to review the General Agreement, they added a
new section to Article XVI. 5 6 The interests of the United States pre-
[U.S.] farm programs then in existence." Id. at 105. See also G. Edward Schuh, Issues in Ai-
cultural Trade Negotiations, 4 ECON. IMPACr 32, 35 (1987).
54 HATHAWAY, supra note 47, at 105.
55 Article XVI(1) states:
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of
income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase ex-
ports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its terri-
tory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and
nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the
quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported from its
territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any
case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any
other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the
contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the
other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XVI(1), reprinted in 1 B.I.S.D. (GATT) 54 (1952).
56 Sections B(2)-(5) of Article XVI reads as follows:
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of
a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects for other
contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause undue distur-
bance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder the achievement
of the objectives of this Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on
the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly
or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any
primary product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a man-
ner which results in that contracting party haviig more than an equitable share
of world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares of the
contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representa-
tive period, and any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting
such trade in that product.
4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter,
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of
sdbsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which sub-
sidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the
comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic mar-
ket. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of
any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955 by the introduc-
tion of a new, or the extension of existing, subsidies.
5. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the operation of the provisions
of this Article from time to time with a view to examining its effectiveness, in
the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives of this Agreement
and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the trade or interests of con-
tracting parties.
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vailed again and a distinction was made between the regulation of sub-
sidies on primary and non-primary products. The purpose of the
introduction of a different regime for subsidies on primary products
was to preserve U.S. agricultural policies. Thus, in a report prepared at
the request of Senator Ribicoff in 1973, one can read that "the GAT
provisions on export subsidies on primary products reflect the position
taken by the United States on this matter when the GATT was reviewed
in 1955."57
After the Review Session of 1955, GATT prohibited export subsi-
dies for non-primary products for those Contracting Parties that ac-
cepted Article XVI(4). 58 With regard to primary products, the Review
Session produced one of the most ambiguous and criticized articles of
the General Agreement: Article XVI(3). 59 According to this provi-
sion, the Contracting Parties "should seek to avoid the use of subsidies
on the export of primary products."60 If, however, a Contracting Party
does grant subsidies that operate "to increase the export of any pri-
mary product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a
manner which results in that contracting party having more than an
equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being
taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the prod-
uct during a previous representative period, and any special factors
which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the
product."61
C. The Creation of the European Economic Community and the Birth
of CAP
Some years after the GATT was opened for signature, Germany,
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands, all GATT
Contracting Parties, 62 created the European Economic Community
under the Treaty of Rome.63 The establishment of a common market
among these countries gave rise to some concerns as to its compatibil-
ity with the General Agreement, which are summarized in the discus-
sion that follows.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XVI(B).
57 COMM. ON FINANCE, UNrED STATES SENATE, 93D CONG., lST SESS., THE ADEQUACY OF
GATT PROVISIONS DEAING wrra AGRICULTURE I (Comm. Print 1973).
58 On November 19, 1960, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States signed a Declaration giving effect to Article XVI(4). See E. Bruce Butler, Countervailing
Duties and Export Subsidization: A Rten-e ng Issue in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 91
(1968).
59 See GATT, supra note 5, art. XVI(3).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were GATT original Contracting
Parties. Italy joined GATT on May 30, 1950, and Germany on October 1, 1951. GATT, 1
B.I.S.D. (GATT) 127-135 (1952).
63 See Treaty of Rome, supranote 1.
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GATT permits the creation of Custom Unions64 or Free Trade Ar-
eas65 if they fulfill the conditions set out in Article XXIV. The founda-
tion of this exception to the most-favored-nation clause lies in the idea
that they have trade promoting effects. Thus Custom Unions and Free
Trade Areas are considered beneficial if they do not impair trade inter-
ests of third countries. Since the Treaty of Rome provides for a com-
mon external tariff, the EC falls squarely within the concept of
Customs Union. To be entitled to the exception set forth in Article
XXIV, a Custom Union must (1) provide for the elimination of duties
and other restrictive regulations of commerce with respect to substan-
tially all the trade between the members66 and (2) not raise the level
of protection with regard to third countries.67
According to Article XXIV(7), any GATT Contracting Party decid-
ing to enter into a Customs Union shall notify the Contracting Parties
and make available to them such information to consider the agree-
ment. In fulfillment of this requirement, the EC treaty was presented
to the GATT in March of 1957. Baron Snoy, speaking on behalf of the
six European States, stressed the conformity of the Treaty of Rome
with the General Agreement and gave the "firm assurance.., that as
long as the Six would remain contracting parties to the General Agree-
ment they would scrupulously observe their obligations under this
Agreement."68 Baron Snoy's optimism was not shared by most GATT
members. When the Contracting Parties examined the Treaty of
Rome in their XII Session, almost all participants raised objections to
the text. They feared that the Treaty of Rome would increase the trade
barriers between the newly created organization and non-member
states, the main points of contention being the establishment of a com-
mon external tariff, quantitative restrictions, the association treaties
64 According to GAIT Article XXIV(8) (a):
A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single cus-
toms territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX)
are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constit-
uent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the
trade in products originating in such territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties
and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of
the union to the trade of territories not included in the union.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV(8) (a).
65 According to GAIT Article XXIV(8) (b), "A free-trade area shall be understood to
mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII,
XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories in products originating in such territories." GAT, supra note 5, art. XXIV(8) (b).
66 GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV(8).
67 GAT, supra note 5, art. XXIV(5).
68 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EC as a GATT Member, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY
AND GAIT 23, 34 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Baron Snoy
d'Oppuers speaking to the Intersessional Committee of the GAT Contracting Parties in
1957, GAIT Doc. IC/SR 39).
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with overseas territories, and the managed approach with regard to
trade in agricultural products.69 As a consequence, they decided to set
up a Committee charged with the analysis of the compatibility of the
contested issues with GATT.70 Interestingly, the Committee was un-
able to come up with a definite conclusion. Legal analysis was clouded
by political and economic considerations. It soon became apparent
that since all EC Member States were GATT Contracting Parties, it was
unrealistic to take a tough stand.71 Thus the creation of the EC was
accepted on pragmatic considerations leaving legal analysis to a second
level. 72 Ironically, the United States was the Contracting Party that
most firmly supported the creation of the EC, anticipating that it
would be a good market for U.S. products.73 In addition, the establish-
ment of the EC was central to U.S. foreign policy objectives. "If a pro-
tectionist Common Agricultural Policy was the price to pay for political
stability and economic prosperity in Western Europe, so be it. The
long-term advantages for the general U.S. interest were viewed as far
outweighing the short-term costs to special interests in agriculture."74
D. The European Community Export Refunds Under the General
Agreement
The third irony in connection with GATT regulation of agricul-
ture is that over the years the ambiguities of Article XVI(3), which was
introduced at the insistence of the United States, would act as a shield
in favor of the export refunds introduced by the EC in the context of
its Common Agricultural Policy.75 As a consequence of the success of
the CAP, over the years the Community became one of the world's
leading exporters of a number of agricultural products. This caused
friction with other GATT Contracting Parties, notably the United
States and other agricultural exporters. Ironically, the rules that had
69 See De Lacharri~re, L'Examen par le GATT du Traitd de Rome instituant la Communauti
EconomiqueEuropenne, ANN mAE FRANCAISE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 621 (1958) [hereinafter
A.F.D.I] (analyzing the compatibility of the EEC treaty with GATT); Bourgeois, Le GATT et le
Traiti CEE, in Dinrrro COMUNrrAIO E DEGLI SCAMBI INTERNAzIONALu, Annot. XIX, No. 1, 32
(1980).
70 The Treaties Establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy
Community, 6 B.I.S.D. (GATT) 68, 68 (1958).
71 As De Lacharrihre has noted, if the Treaty of Rome had been "condemned," GATT
would have exploded. De Lacharrihre, supra note 69, at 634.
72 The Contracting Parties never reached a formal and definitive conclusion as to the
compatibility of the Treaty of Rome with the GATT. Bourgeois, Le CAT et le Traiti CEE,
supra note 69, at 35.
73 See PETER COFFEY, THE EXTERNAL ECONOMic RELATONS OF THE EEC 19 (1976).
74 Michel Petit, The Agricultural Trade Confrontation between the United States and the Euro.
pean Community: A Challenge to Our Profession, 2 AGmc. ECoN. 185, 188 (1988) [hereinafter The
Agricultural Trade Confrontation). As Nicholas Butler has pointed out, "the true difficulties
which the nature of the CAP and the operation of its mechanisms were going to present to
the United States only emerged later." Nicholas Butler, The Ploughshares War Between Europe
and America, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 105, 108 (1983).
75 See CAP, supra note 1.
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been introduced after World War II to allow the maintenance of U.S.
farm policies would now prevent the United States and other Con-
tracting Parties from threatening the basic mechanisms. of the CAP,
namely its export refunds. In order to illustrate this assertion, a brief
analysis follows of the two cases in which the compatibility of the ex-
port refunds granted by the EC with the General Agreement was put
into question.
On September 25, 1978, Australia filed a complaint under GATT
against the EC, challenging the compatibility of the latter's export
sugar refunds with Article XVI(3) of the General Agreement.76 On
November 10, 1978, Brazil filed another complaint against the very
same practices, using arguments almost identical to those presented by
Australia. 77 Although two different panels were set up, the members
of the two panels were the same, and the development of the proce-
dures was very similar.78 Some twenty years before, a GATT" panel had
ruled against France for using export subsidies on wheat flour similar
to those under attack in 1978. 79 The question posed by these cases was
76 European Communities-Refunds on Exporti of Sugar, 26 B.I.S.D. (GATT) 290, 292
(1979) [hereinafter Refunds on Exports of Sugar.
According to GATT Article XXIII, when any GATT Contracting Party considers that any
benefit accruing to it directly under the General Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or
that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded, as a result of non-
compliance, the application by another Contracting Party of any measure, regardless of
whether it conflicts or not with GATT, or any other situation, it may hold consultations with
the other Contracting Party in order to settle the matter. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXXIII.
If consultations fail, "the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
[which] shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them, and shall make appropriate
recommendations" or rulings, as appropriate. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII.
Over the years, the Contracting Parties developed the practice of appointing panels
composed of governmental experts, which are expected to investigate the matter in light of
the relevant GATE provisions and submit a report to the Contracting Parties. For the report
to have legal force, it has to be adopted by the Contracting Parties. Because the decisions are
adopted by consensus, the losing party might block or bog down the procedure. In order to
prevent this situation, the panels have traditionally tried to accommodate the interests of the
contending parties in their reports, sometimes leaving legal considerations to a second plane.
The composition of the panels, their advisory nature, the disputes as to what their func-
tion should be, and the fact that the last say belongs to the Contracting Parties has prevented
the panels from trying to clarify the meaning of many rules that are unclear or ambiguous.
See Miguel Montafi-Mora, A GATT With Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of Inter-
national Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993) (analyzing GATE dispute set-
tlement from an historical perspective).
77 See European Communities-Refunds on Export of Sugar: Complaint &y Brazil, 27 B.I.S.D.
(GATE) 69, 97 (1980) [hereinafter Complaint by Brazil].
78 Id.; see also Refunds on Exports of Sugar, supra note 76.
79 In 1958, Australia filed a complaint against France alleging that the latter had stolen
its wheat flour markets in Ceylon, Indonesia, and Malaya. According to Australia, as a result
of the subsidies on wheat and wheat flour granted by France, Australian exports had been
displaced by French wheat flour in those markets. In spite of the ambiguity of GATE Article
XVI(3), the panel concluded that the French practices were subsidies within the terms of
Article XVI(3). French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Four, 7 B.I.S.D. (GATE) 46
(1959).
To reach this conclusion, the panelists undertook a complex analysis of the evolution of
world export markets on wheat flour in the previous years. They pointed out that French
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whether the fragile fabric of Article XVI(3) could resist the strain
brought by a complaint against one of the two GATT superpowers.
Australia and Brazil alleged that the export refund scheme main-
tained by the EC (1) had resulted in the Community having more than
an equitable share of world export trade in sugar; (2) had caused or
threatened to cause serious prejudice to their interests, in that the EC
exports had displaced Australian and Brazilian sugar from their tradi-
tional markets; and (3) had nullified or impaired benefits accruing to
them under the General Agreement."°
The first issue addressed by the panel was whether the export re-
funds could be considered subsidies in light of Article XVI of the Gen-
eral Agreement.81 The panel found that the export refunds were
granted to enable Community sugar to be exported and that the re-
funds thus granted were financed out of the European Agriculture
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).82 According to the panel,
this Fund was a government fund of the type mentioned in the Notes
and Supplementary Provisions to Article XVI(3).83 As a result, it con-
cluded that the export refunds were subsidies subject to the provisions
of Article XVI.
After noting that the EC had disclosed the export refund scheme
and held consultations with Australia in compliance with Article
exports had increased dramatically since 1954. See id. at 53. In addition, they noted that
while French exports of wheat flour increased 57% from 1954 to 1958, the Australian share
of exports decreased to 37%. Id. at 54-55. They also took into account the fact that while the
export price for wheat flour charged by Australia and other countries exceeded the export
price for wheat by 30 to 50%, French exporters were selling wheat and wheat flour almost at
the same price. Id. at 53.
The most interesting contribution of this panel is the introduction of the notion of "dis-
placement", which twenty years later would be codified in the Code on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Duties of 1979. See id. at 55. See Colin Phegan, GATTArticle XVI:3: ExOM Subsidies
and "Equitable Shares," 16J. WoRLD TRADE L. 251 (1982); William H. Boger, III, The United
States-European Community Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute, 16 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 173,
201-203 (1984); MIGUEL MoNTANA-MoRA, EL CONFLIcro CEE/USA REIATnVO A AS SUBVEN-
CLONES A LA EXPORTAciON DE PRODUCros AiucoLAs: AspEcrosJuRiolcos 122-129 (1991).
80 See GCmplaint by Brazil supra note 77; Refunds on Exports of Sugar, supra note 76.
81 It is to be noted that the EEC had traditionally rejected any assimilation between the
notion of subsidy and the notion of export refund. According to the Community, while the
former is directed to foster exports, the latter is used to place EEC products in world markets
at "world prices," which are artificially low. See Claude Blumann, Les Echanges Agricoles CEE-
Etats-Unis et Leur Encadrement Juridiq.A in LES RELATIONS COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ETATS-
UNts 225, 230 (Jacques Bourrinet ed., 1987). In this case, however, the representative of the
Community recognized that EEC practices fell within the scope of Article XVI, although he
argued that the system "would only be inconsistent with [Article XVI] if it resulted in the
community obtaining more than an equitable share of world export trade." Refunds on Ex-
ports of Sugar, supra note 76, at 290.
82 Refunds on Exports of Sugar, supra note 76, at 305.
83 According to the last sentence of the. Notes to Article KVI(3):
Notwithstanding such determination by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, opera-
tions under such a system shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph 3
where they are wholly or partly financed out of government funds in addition
to the funds collected from producers in respect of the product concerned.
GATr, [vol. I B.I.S.D. at 68.
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XVI(1), the panel examined the consistency of the scheme with Article
XVI(3). 84 The analysis of the panel revealed the flaws and ambiguities
of the section added in 1955. These ambiguities gave rise to disputes
between the contending parties as to the meaning of numerous con-
cepts, namely what was meant by "world export trade," "representative
period," and "equitable share."85 On the other hand, the obscurity of
the language used in Article XVI forced the panel to construct a work-
able interpretation of the most debated concepts. When dealing with
the concept of "equitable share," which is generally considered the
most disputed concept within Article XVI(3), the panel pointed out
that "no definition of the concept 'equitable share' had been pro-
vided, and neither had it in the past been considered absolutely neces-
sary to agree upon a precise definition of the concept."8 6 The panels
deemed it appropriate and sufficient to analyze the main reasons for
developments in individual market shares, and to analyze market and
price developments, and then infer a conclusion on that basis. In so
doing, the panel took up the "displacement standard" set out by a pre-
vious panel in 1958, according to which "'more than an equitable
share of world export trade' should include situations in which the
effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory is to displace the
exports of another signatory, bearing in mind the developments in
world markets."8 7 After an examination of sugar exports statistics, the
panel noted that there had been a steady increase in Community sugar
exports in recent years, coupled with a decline in Australian sales. Nev-
ertheless, the panel found that "there was not sufficient evidence to
state that the increased Community exports in recent years had to a
considerable extent directly displaced Australian exports from world
markets."8 8 Taking into account the difficulties in establishing this
causal relationship, the panel concluded that "it was not in a position
to reach a definite conclusion that the increased share had resulted in
the European Community's having more than an equitable share of
world export trade in that product, in terms of Article XVI(3)." 89 In
practice, this argument, which was repeated in the decision rendered
in connection with the complaint brought by Brazil,90 meant the exon-
eration of the EC under Article XVI(3) as not having "more than an
equitable share" of world export trade in sugar.91 Nonetheless, the
panel considered that the Community system constituted a threat of
84 See Refunds on Exports of Sugar, supra note 76.
85 Id.
86 See Refunds on Exports of Sugar, supra note 76, at 308.
87 See French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, supra note 79, at 55.
88 See Refunds on Exports of Sugar, supra note 76, at 308.
89 Id. at 319.
90 See Complaint by Brazi, supra note 77.
91 Ian Smith, GATT: EEC Sugar Export Refunds Dispute 15 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 534, 538
(1981).
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serious prejudice in terms of Article XVI(1).92
The basic question raised by these cases is why the very same rules
which proved enforceable in 1958 did not work in 1978. One could
answer this question by saying that the facts in these cases were very
different, but it hardly would be persuasive. A more convincing expla-
nation may lie in the considerations that follow.
During the early years, GATT experienced a tremendous success
due to the homogeneity of the initial contracting parties and the
strong consensus in support of the GATT rules. When the panel ex-
amined the so-called French Wheat Flour Case in 1958, 93 Article
XVI(3) proved enforceable because in spite of its ambiguous language,
there was still a strong consensus underlying the norms. During the
1960s and the 1970s, with the dramatic increase in membership and
the loss of GATT's original coherence, there was an increasing depar-
ture from the rules. 94 The degree of adherence that the norms re-
ceived from major actors declined sharply. When the panel was called
to deal with the complaints brought by Australia and Brazil in the EC
Sugar Export Refunds Cases, Contracting Parties regarded as general
principles what they once had considered crystal-clear rules in the very
early years. The erosion of the consensus underlying the norms had
hindered their effectiveness.
The report of the panel in these cases should also be read in light
of the pragmatic approach towards dispute settlement that prevailed
during the 1960s. In the late 1970s, when disputes arose, GATT dis-
pute settlement procedures "had become more an occasion for politics
and conciliation than for objective dispute settlement."95 Though the
creation of the panels in 1952 marked a shift to a more legalistic ap-
proach towards dispute settlement,96 during the 1960s the erosion of
the consensus underlying basic GAIT principles changed the percep-
tion of the Contracting Parties towards legal complaints.9 7 A belief
spread that since some rules were not observed anymore, enforcement
92 Id.
93 French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Rlower, supra note 79.
94 See HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SySTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY, supra note 5
(describing the causes which contributed to the erosion of the GATr).
95 Richard D. Rivers & John D. Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1447, 1464 (1979).
96 During the very early years, the Contracting Parties appointed Working Parties com-
posed of state representatives, who would work out a solution to the dispute. In 1952, during
the 7th Session of the Contracting Parties, the Chairman-apparently due to the large vol-
ume of complaints-suggested the establishment of a Panel to deal with all complaints.
From then on, the practice of establishing a Panel instead of Working Parties became the
usual. See HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 67, 74-76. According to Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, since 1953 only three Working Parties have been established under Arti-
cle XXIU(2). See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International and European Foreign Trade Law:
GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings against the EEC, 22 COMMON MKT. L. Rxv. 441, 469 (1985).
97 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DIspurEs 14 (1978).
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of other rules was improper.98 All these developments led to a relaxa-
tion of the GATT regime.
In addition, the Sugar Export Refunds Cases were a direct attack
on the export refunds scheme of the EC, which is central to the func-
tioning of CAP. It should be noted that the EC had already become
one of GATT's superpowers. Although the United States had shaped
GATT norms on agriculture to serve its commercial goals, the EC
neither participated in the preparation of the GATT, nor formally ac-
ceded to the General Agreement.99 In this context, it was not feasible
for the fragile dispute settlement machinery to strictly enforce a norm
which was not legitimate in the eyes of the EC and to come up with a
report that would have undermined the foundations of the CAP, the
keystone of EC construction.
IH. The Tokyo Round Reforms: Agreement Without Consensus
A. Introduction
When the GATT Contracting Parties launched the Tokyo Round
(1973-1979), the patterns of world trade in agricultural products ex-
perienced dramatic changes. The period 1973-1980 saw the EC's share
of world imports fall substantially, while its exports were growing stead-
ily. 100 "In 1974, the Community was a major importer of dairy prod-
ucts, sugar and beef. By 1981 it had become the world's largest dairy
exporter, number two in world sugar trade and the exporter of over
60,000 tons of beef."10 1 Some years later it would become one of the
world's largest exporters of wheat flour, poultry, and barley.'0 2 "In
1979, the Community of Nine crossed an important commercial and
political watershed. For the first time, it became a net exporter of tem-
perate foodstuffs."10 3 Furthermore, in 1974 only twenty-two percent of
the EAGGF was devoted to financing export refunds, but by 1980 this
percentage had increased to fifty percent. 104
Although the 1970s was a golden decade for U.S. agriculture, the
U.S. Administration was increasingly disturbed by the growing compe-
tition of the EC in third markets. The United States "main concern
98 See Montafifi-Mora, A GATT With Teeth, supra note 76 (providing an overview of GATT
dispute settlement from an historical perspective).
99 The EC is a member de facto of GATT because it has never acceded to the General
Agreement. Nonetheless, it has participated in its own name in all the rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations since the Dillon Round (1961) and is a Contracting Party to all the codes
adopted during the Tokyo Round. See PETERSMANN, TheEC as a GATTMember, supra note 68,
at 23 (discussing the position of the EC within GATr).
100 See Brian L. Pierson, American Agricultural Exports and the EEC's Gommon Agricultural
Policy (CAP), 1 Wis. INT'L L.J. 133, 135 (1982).
101 Butler, supra note 74, at 115.
102 See Subsidies Threaten a Trade War in Food, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 8, 1982, at 37.
103 FRANcois DUCHENE ET AL., NEW LIMITs ON EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE: POLITICS AND THE
COMMON AGRICULTURAL Poucy 35 (1985).
104 See OCDE, supra note 4, at 22.
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was the increased resort to subsidies by its trading partners, particularly
the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC."10 5 United States exporters
wanted the U.S. Administration to take some action against the Com-
munity's ever-increasing use of export subsidies. "The United States
government sought to deflect these pressures for warlike action by
promising to negotiate more effective GATT rules, [and] a new Subsi-
dies Code that would provide for effective legal control of export subsi-
dies." 106 During the first three years of the Tokyo Round of
negotiations, the United States tried to force the EC to abandon CAP
in a process that Robert Strauss, Head of the U.S. Delegation, de-
scribed as "barking at the moon.' 0 7 Other countries, namely Australia
and Canada, also expressed the view that "there should be much better
rules to limit export subsidies on agricultural products."108
On the other hand, "the Community's mandate did not permit it
to accept any new obligations limiting the use of subsidies. Commu-
nity negotiators were authorized only to affirm and restate those sub-
sidy obligations already contained in existing GATT texts."' 0 9 They
feared that a stringent regulation of subsidies could undermine CAP,
which in the words of the EC negotiator, was the "glue that held the
European Community together."" 0 In addition, the EC insisted on
stringent regulation of the countervailing duties, to limit U.S. discre-
tion when adopting countervailing measures. The main objective of
the EC was to force the United States to incorporate the so-called "in-
jury test" into its countervailing duty legislation."' Thus when the ne-
gotiations started, there was deep disagreement as to what weight
should be given to subsidies on the one hand, and to countervailing
duties on the other.112.
The disputes over the use of subsidies were not limited to the agri-
105 Gary Horlick et al.; Government Actions Against Domestic Subsidies: An Analysis of the
International Rules and an Introduction to the United States'Practice, in LEIAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 1, 11 (1986) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter L.I.E.I.].
106 Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible": Some Reflections on the Nature of Litiga-
tion Between Governments, 72 MiNN. L. REV. 211, 219 (1987).
107 Jeffery S. Estabrook, European Community Resistance to the Enforcement of GATT Panel
Decisions on Sugar Export Subsidies, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 397, 419 (1982).
108 Rodney Grey, Some Notes on Subsidies and the International Rules, in INTERFACE THREE:
LEGAL TREATMENT OF DOMETIC SUBSIDIES 61, 64 (Don Wallace, Jr. et al. eds., 1984).
109 Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible, "supra note 106, at 220. "La CEE eut une attitude
tr~s ferme face aux Etats-Unis et subordonna I'avancbe des ngociations relatives au code i
leur acceptacion du critbre du prejudice important et A leur reconnaissance de sa politique
agricole commune." Marie-Claude de Bus, La CEE et le Code sur les Subventions et les Droits
Compensateurs, 1 REVUE TIMESTRmELLE DE DRorr EUROPEEN 33, 40 (1981).
110 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 95, at 1452 (citing Alistair Sutton, one of the two EC
negotiators).
111 The U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 did not require "injury" to domestic industry as a condi-
tion to impose countervailing duties on subsidized imports. The law did not violate GATT
Article VI because it was sheltered by the grandfather clause included in the Protocol of
Provisional Application of 1947.
112 See GATT, LAS NEGOC1ACIONES COMERCIALES MULTILATERALES DE LA RONDA DE ToKYo:
INF oRM, DEL DIRECTOR GENERAL DEL GATT 68 (1979).
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cultural field. United States negotiators were opposed to all kinds of
subsidies for ideological reasons. Behind the scenes, there was a deep
conflict of philosophies as to what the proper role of a government in
a market economy should be. Although the United States does not
always refuse government involvement in economy, "it has an attach-
ment to the principles of free market economics greater than that of
most other countries." 113 According to the United States, any subsidy
introduces a distortion in the economy, which is bad per se. On the
contrary, other countries contend that subsidies are a legitimate exer-
cise of domestic sovereignty directed to correct the imperfections of
international markets. 114
There was also deep disagreement in connection with the compe-
tence of the "Agriculture Group." While the EC held that all problems
relating to trade in agricultural products should be dealt with in this
group, the United States maintained that each issue should be ad-
dressed within the group to which it was most closely related. 115 For
example, the United States wanted the problems raised by the use of
export subsidies to agricultural products to be dealt with in the "Subsi-
dies Group."11 6 In addition, the United States proposed to establish a
new regulation according to the so-called "traffic-light approach." 1 7
This approach classified subsidies in three categories: prohibited
(red), conditionally allowed (amber), and permitted (green).118 After
much discussion, the United States agreed to drop this point and as-
sented to build the new regime upon the norms of the General
Agreement.119
B. The Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties of 1979:
Unbridged Policy Differences
In spite of the unfavorable negotiation context described above,
the negotiators finally reached an agreement on a new text, referred to
as the "Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI,
XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," most
commonly known as the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
113 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 95, at 1449.
114 See COMMISSION CEE, LE BiLAN DE FONCTIONNEMENT DU CODE DES SUBVENTIONS ET DES
DROrrS COMPENSATEURS APPLIQUES Aux PRODUrrs AurREs QUE PA isaREs 34 (1988); see also
J.F. BESELER & A.N. WLiLAMs, ANTIDUMPING AND ANTISUBSIDY LAw: THE EC 15 (1986).
This ideological conflict is aggravated by the deep disagreement among economists in
connection with the effects of subsidies on international trade and the legitimacy of the
measures imposed to countervail their effects.
115 As a result of this dispute, the Group did not meet between December 1975 and
December 1977. See D.M. McRae & J.C. Thomas, The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making:
The Tokyo Round, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 64-65 (1983).
116 See GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION
170 (1986).
117 Id. at 171.
118 Id.
119 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 95, at 1466.
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of 1979 (Code). 120 The Code is divided into seven parts, which regu-
late respectively Countervailing Duties, Subsidies, Developing Coun-
tries, Special Situations, the establishment of a Committee to
administer the Code, Dispute Settlement, and Final Provisions. 121
Some of these aspects will be examined in the following pages.
The purpose of the Code, as stated in the preamble, is not to elim-
inate subsidies as such. Rather, its emphasis is on the effects of subsi-
dies in international trade. This emphasis is also apparent in the
"General Provisions" on subsidies embodied in Article 8 of the Code.
The compromise reached between the United States and the Commu-
nity is best illustrated in the language of Article 8(1) of the Code. Ac-
cording to this Article, "signatories recognize that subsidies are used by
governments to promote important objectives of social and economic
policy," but they "also recognize that subsidies may cause adverse ef-
fects to the interests of other signatories." 12 2 As a consequence, the
signatories undertake not to use export subsidies in a way inconsistent
with the norms of the Code.123 In addition, "they shall seek to avoid
causing, through the use of any subsidy: (a) injury to the domestic
industry of another signatory, (b) nullification or impairment of the
benefits accruing directly or indirectly to another signatory under the
General Agreement, or (c) serious prejudice to the interests of an-
other signatory." 124 For the purposes of this Article, it is important to
highlight that nullification or impairment, or the existence of serious
prejudice, may arise through "the effects of the subsidized exports in
displacing the exports of like products of another signatory from a
third country market."125
The Code refines the notification and consultation duty included
in Article XVI(1) of the General Agreement, which, incidently, is the
only section that binds all GATT Contracting Parties. In order to over-
come the limitations of the self notification regime, the Code allows
signatories to make written requests for information on the subsidies
granted by another signatory. According to Article 7 of the Code, any
Contracting Party "may make a written request for information on the
nature and extent of any subsidy granted or maintained by another
signatory ... which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports
of any product from or reduce imports of any product into its terri-
120 In force since January 1, 1980. See The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articleks VI, XVI, XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in 26 B.I.S.D. (GAT) 56
(1980) [hereinafter Code].
121 Id.
122 Code, supra note 120, art. 8(2).
123 Id.
124 Code, supra note 120, art. 8(3).
125 Code, supra note 120, art. 8(4)(c). They may also arise through: "(a) the effects of
the subsidized imports in the domestic market of the importing signatory, (b) the effects of
the subsidy in displacing or impeding the imports of like products into the market of the
subsidizing country." Code, supra note 120, art. 8(4) (a) & (b).
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tory."126 If that signatory fails to provide the requested information,
the Contracting Party concerned may bring the matter to the Commit-
tee set up in Article 16 to administer the Code. In addition, if a signa-
tory fails to notify the Contracting Parties of a subsidy, any Contracting
Party can bring it to the attention of the Committee.' 27
With regard to export subsidies, the agricultural exporter coun-
tries sought to subject both industrial and agricultural subsidies to the
same regime, but they did not succeed.' 28 Ironically, while in 1955 the
interests of U.S. farmers were too powerful to fall under the same disci-
pline as industrial subsidies, it was now the EC who would keep agricul-
tural subsidies out of the general regime. Article 9 of the Code
prohibits export subsidies on non-primary products altogether. The
problem is that the negotiators were not able to find a definition of
.export subsidy" acceptable both to the United States and the Commu-
nity. Although it may sound perplexing, they tried to subject to strin-
gent norms something they were unable to define. In order to
alleviate the absence of a definition, the Code provides an illustrative
list of practices constituting export subsidies. The list, which was based
on another list drafted by a Working Party in 1955, is important be-
cause it provides an important source for interpretation. However, it
has failed to resolve many interpretative problems. The absence of a
definition of "subsidy" has led to different interpretations.' 2 9 Some
scholars contend that the meaning of subsidy used in Articles 7
through 19 (Track II) is the same as the meaning used in Articles 1
through 6 (Track I),130 which regulate the conditions for imposing
126 Code, supra note 120, art. 7.
127 Code, supra note 120, art. 16(1).
128 Note, however, that the minerals, which were considered primary products falling
under Article XVI(3), would now be considered industrial products, thus falling under Arti-
cle XVI(4).
129 As a consequence of the deep differences between the EC and the United States, the
negotiations failed to produce a definition of the very same thing they were trying to regu-
late. To remedy the lack of a definition, they annexed to the Code an illustrative list of
practices that should be considered export subsidies. The fact that they did not adopt a
definitive list, but only an illustrative list, has been criticized by some scholars, who consider
that "this fact creates uncertainty in the application of the GATT rules." Balassa, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures: Economic Considerations, 23 J. WORLD TRADE L. 63, 64 (1989).
It should be noted that the list can be an important source of interpretation when trying
to establish if a practice falls within the concept of subsidy. However, the United States has
expressed the view that the list may be used to define a subsidy in the context of Part II of the
Code (Regulation of Subsidies), but not in the context of Part I (Regulation of Counter-
vailing Duties). The purpose of this interpretation is to prevent the Code from curtailing the
discretion of the U.S. Administration in deciding which practices are subsidies according to
U.S. countervailing duty legislation. SeeJACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 5,
at 260.
130 As stated above, the Code is divided into seven parts. See supra note 121 and accom-
panying text. The first two parts are normally referred to as Track I and Track II. Track I is
related to Article VI of GATT and sets forth conditions under which a Contracting Party may
levy countervailing duties on subsidized imports. Track II is related to Article XVI of GATT.
It regulates the conditions under which the contracting parties may grant domestic and ex-
port subsidies. Benyon & Bourgeois, The EC-US Steel Agreemen 21 COMMON MKT. L. Ra,. 305,
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countervailing duties, while others argue that the Code uses a different
concept of subsidy in each track.' 3 '
The norms dealing with agricultural export subsidies are much
more permissive. Article 10(1) of the Code is essentially a reprint of
Article XVI(3) of the General Agreement, although the former uses
more stringent language than the latter. Although Article 10(1) says
that "signatories agree not to grant directly or indirectly any export
subsidy on certain primary products ... " 132 the latter contains merely
a hortatory norm: "Contracting Parties should seek to avoid the use of
subsidies on the export of primary products." 33 In light of this differ-
ence, some commentators hold that "le tode fait de la simple obligation
morale, une obligation expresse."' 34
In addition, the Code introduces some new guidelines directed to
ease the application of some of the concepts used in that article. Tak-
ing up the "displacement standard" elaborated on by the panel on
French export subsidies on wheat flour in 1958,135 the Code considers
that a "'more than equitable share of world export trade' shall include
any case in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory
is to displace the exports of another signatory bearing in mind the
developments on world markets."13 6 It remains to be seen whether
this standard will prove workable in the future, considering the tre-
mendous difficulties faced by the panels in the Sugar Export Refunds
cases in 1979.13 7 The new norms of the Code provide a further clue to
give meaning to the notion of "more than equitable share." According
to Article 10(2) (b), "with regard to new markets, traditional patterns
of supply of the product concerned to the world market, region or
country, in which the new market is situated shall be taken into ac-
count in determining 'equitable share of world export trade.'"138
As a response to the problems raised in the Sugar Export Refund
cases to establish a "previous representative period," the Code provides
that this period "shall normally be the three most recent calendar years
in which normal market conditions existed.' 39 Unfortunately, the
Code does not give any guidelines to determine the meaning of "nor-
327 (1984); EDMOND McGOvERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 335 (1986).
131 See BESELER & WIuIAMs, ANTIDUMPING AND ANTISUBSIDY PRACrcEs 118 (1986). The
arguments offered by Horlick et al. in connection with Articles VI and XVI of the General
Agreement are also applicable to track I and II of the Code. See Horlick, supra note 105, at 9.
132 Code, supra note 120, art. 10(1).
133 GATT, supra note 5, art. XVI(3).
134 de Bus, supra note 109, at 44.
135 See discussion supra note 79.
136 Code, supra note 120, art. 10(2)(a).
137 See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
138 Code, sura note 120, art. 10(2)(b).
139 Code, supra note 120, art. 10(2)(c).
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mal market conditions."14° Finally, the Code tries to prevent a Con-
tracting Party from using export subsidies to dump its products in
particular markets. According to Article 10(3), "[s]ignatories further
agree not to grant export subsidies on exports of certain primary prod-
ucts to a particular market in a manner which results in prices materi-
ally below those of other suppliers to the same market."141
In connection with domestic subsidies, Article 11 establishes, for
the first time in GATr's history, norms on "subsidies other than export
subsidies" with effects on international trade. 142 This Article stresses
the declaration embodied in Article 8 according to which these subsi-
dies are used by governments to promote important objectives of social
and economic policy. According to Article 11, the Code does not in-
tend to restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve
important policy objectives that they consider desirable, such as "the
elimination of industrial, economic and social disadvantages of specific
regions."143 Following the tone of Article 8, signatories recognize in
Article 11 (2) that such subsidies "may cause or threaten to cause injury
to a domestic industry" of other signatories or "may nullify or impair
benefits accruing to another signatory under the General Agreement,
in particular where such subsidies would adversely affect the condi-
tions of normal competition."1 44  Consequently, signatories "shall
therefore seek to avoid causing such effects through the use of subsi-
dies."' 45 The article also recommends that signatories take into ac-
count possible adverse effects on trade when evaluating the internal
objectives to be achieved with these subsidies. In light of the soft lan-
guage used in Article 11(2), it would be difficult to argue that it en-
compasses any legal obligation.
The third paragraph of Article 11 gives some guidance as to what
practices fall under the concept of "subsidies other than export subsi-
dies." A general requirement is "specificity," that is, that the subsidy is
140 Belayneh Seyoum, Export Subsidies under the MTN: An Analysis with Particular Emphasis
on Developing Countries, 18 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 512, 515 (1984).
141 Code supra note 120, art. 10(3).
142 SeeJACKSON, THE WoRLD TRADING SYrEM, supra note 5, at 259.
143 Code, supra note 120, art. 11(1) (a). The other objectives listed in Article 11(1) are:
(b) to facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable conditions, of cer-
tain sectors, especially where this has become necessary by reason of changes in
trade and economic policies, including international agreements resulting in
lower barriers to trade,
(c) generally to sustain employment and to encourage re-training and change
in employment,
(d) to encourage research and development programmes, especially in the
field of high technology industries,
(e) the implementation of economic programmes and policies to promote the
economic and social development of developing countries,
(f) redeployment of industry in order to avoid congestion and environmental
problems.
Code, supra note 120, art. 11(1).
144 Code, supra note 120, art. 11(2).
145 Id.
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granted "with the aim of giving an advantage to certain enterprises."14 6
The Article gives some examples of practices that are deemed to be
domestic subsidies: government financing of commercial enterprises,
including grants, loans or guarantees, government financing of re-
search and development programs, and fiscal incentives, among
others.
The Code also introduces new norms designed to take into ac-
count the specific interests of developing Contracting Parties,
although it fails to fulfill their expectations. 147 The Code recognizes
that "subsidies are an integral part of economic development program-
mes of developing countries." 48 An important element of satisfaction
for these countries is that they are exempted from the prohibition of
export subsidies on non-primary products.' 4 9 (Article 14(2)).150 In ad-
dition, "there shall be no presumption that export subsidies granted by
developing country signatories result in adverse effects, as defined in
this Agreement, to the trade or production of another signatory." 151
Countries claiming the existence of such effects will have to prove
them. The new regulation aims at favoring primarily the competitive
position of least developed countries. Thus, advanced developing sig-
natories "should endeavour to enter into a commitment to reduce or
eliminate export subsidies when the use of such export subsidies is in-
consistent with its competitive and development needs."' 52 With re-
gard to export subsidies on primary products, there are no specific
rules for developing signatories.' 53
Another characteristic of the Code is the creation of a Committee
charged with the supervision of the operation of the Agreement'54 and
the introduction of a stringent dispute settlement mechanism, 155
which compares with the General Agreement and other codes and is
"definitely an improvement." 56 The new procedure includes strict
deadlines, an automatic right to have a panel established if conciliation
fails, and follow-up procedures. The refinements introduced in these
articles are basically a concession by the EC to the United States in
return for not putting into question the whole structure of CAP. As
Professor Hudec has pointed out, the EC's largest concession in the
negotiations was perhaps the establishment of a new and more strin-
146 Code, supra note 120, art. 11(3).
147 Se Seyoum, supra note 140, 523-524.
148 Code, supra note 120, art. 14(1).
149 Code, supra note 120, art. 14(2).
150 See Jo6l Lebullenger, La portie des nouveUes rgles du GAT) en faveur des Partes Con-
tractantes en voi de diveloppement, 86 REVuE GEN. DRorr INT'L PUBIC 254, 267 (1982).
151 Code, supra note 120, art. 14(4).
152 Code, supra note 120, art. 14(5).
153 Code, supra note 120, art. 14(10).
154 Code, supra note 120, art. 16.
155 Code, supra note 120, arts. 12, 13, 17 & 18.
156 Horlick, supra note 105, at 18.
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gent dispute settlement procedure.' 5 7 "It was as though, being barred
from making any substantive concessions, the Community negotiators
had turned to dispute settlement as the only thing left to give."' 58
A detailed study of the text reveals that the Code is long on rheto-
ric but short on substantive reforms. While it was drafted to redress
the deficient regulation of subsidies embodied in the General Agree-
ment, the lack of consensus between the United States and the EC
produced a text which is basically a confirmation of the former regime.
Although it is true that some of the concepts used in Article XVI were
refined, and that the Code includes a stringent dispute settlement
mechanism, the fundamental issues, namely the concept of subsidy or
the notion of "more than equitable share," remain untouched.
In spite of these timid reforms, some member governments of the
EC feared that "the new Code could still lead to legal actions seeking
to undermine the Common Agricultural Policy. They asked for some
assurance that the new Code would.not be used in this manner."1 59
This last minute crisis could have undermined the whole Tokyo Round
of multilateral trade negotiations. To avoid the collapse of the Round,
Strauss, Head of the U.S. Delegation, wrote a secret letter to Gunde-
lach, his EC counterpart. According to some sources, in this letter
Strauss confirmed to Gundelach that the United States would not use
the Code to attack the CAP.1r ° As a result, the EC dropped its last-
minute objections and accepted the Code 161 Perplexing as it may
sound, in the end, the most important policy difference in the bilateral
relations between the United States and the EC was purportedly settled
through a "gentlemen's agreement"162 that, indeed, did not reflect any
real consensus between the two blocks. In addition, since these agree-
ments do not give rise to legal obligations, they lack what we have
called the "appeasement of domestic pressures" function. The pur-
pose of this agreement was to overcome the difficulties posed by do-
mestic decision making procedures. If the content of this secret
agreement had been included in the text of the Code, Congress would
not have given its approval to the Tokyo Round accords. In fact, gen-
tlemen's agreements are good techniques to reach agreements in in-
ternational fora, bypassing domestic decision-making structures. The
problem is that "the procedural ease with which de facto agreements
157 Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible," supra note 106, at 221.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See La politique agricole commune et le GATT, 298 LES NoTEs BLEus 2 (1986).
161 Id.
162 In international law, "gentlemen's agreement" means an international accord that is
not legally binding, although it creates political or moral obligations. See Schachter, The Twi-
light Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 Am. J. Irr'L L. 296 (1977) (analyzing
the legal nature of these agreements). Some authors call these agreements "de facto agree-
ments" (Roessler) or "extralegal agreements" (Bothe). See Roessler, supra note 41, at 27, 40-
56; Bothe, supra note 31, at 68.
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can be adopted deprives them of the guarantee of national
consensus."'
163
Although the Code was presented in the United States as a major
accomplishment, 164 the future prospects for the Code remain murky.
As Hudec has put it, "when one finds the tendency to create paper
obligations coupled with the tendency to write more rigorous litigation
rules, one can expect to find dramatic legal failures." 165
C. Functioning of the Code on Subsidies in Practice
To fairly assess the functioning of any set of legal rules special
attention must be given to the context in which those rules are called
to operate. The circumstances which surrounded world trade in agri-
cultural products at the beginning of the 1980s were certainly not the
most adequate to test the fragile norms drafted during the Tokyo
Round to cope with agricultural export subsidies., After two decades of
steady increases, world trade in agricultural products had begun to fall.
"As export markets stagnated and production increased, the competi-
tion for these markets increased, and the food crisis turned into a
trade crisis."' 166 The recession of the early 1980s was especially painful
for U.S. agriculture, which saw the worst crisis since the Great Depres-
sion. 167 In addition, other factors made things worse, namely the U.S.
embargo on wheat exports to the USSR, the emergence of new com-
petitors, and an overvalued dollar. Since many U.S. farmers were not
able to return the capital they had borrowed during the golden 1970s,
they were thrown into bankruptcy. Meanwhile, EC exports were grow-
ing steadily. In fact, the Community had become the world's leading
exporter of many agricultural products. 168 "The Tokyo Round had
created expectations of changes in EC policy that had not occurred.
The economic harms being caused by the CAP were growing, particu-
larly in U.S. export markets in third countries. The situation had pro-
duced strong political pressure for some kind of vigorous response."' 69
The pressures on the U.S. government to "do something" were enor-
mous. °7 0 As a response, between December 1981 and July 1982, the
United States lodged six complaints under GATT. The six complaints
had two things in common: They were related to trade in agricultural
163 Roessler, supra note 41, at 55.
164 See Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible," supra note 106, at 222.
165 Id. at 223.
166 HATHAWAY, supra note 47, at 16.
167 See Doug Bereuter, Farm Trade: A U.S. Viewpoint: Congressman Urges Reforms to Europe's
Common Agricultural Policy, 255 EUROPE 12 (1986).
168 See Subsidies Threaten a Trade War in Food, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 8, 1982, at 37.
169 Robert E. Hudec, Legal Issues in US-EC Trade Policy: GATE Litigation 1960-1985, in
ISSUES IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS 17, 41 (Robert E. Baldwin et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter
Legal Issues].
170 Bereuter, supra note 167, a.t 12-14.
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products, and they were directed against the EC. 171 A brief examina-
tion of the first case brought under the Code follows.
On September 29, 1981, the U.S. Trade Representative accepted a
petition of Miller's National Federation, alleging that EC export subsi-
dies on wheat flour had caused the EC share of the world market to
increase significantly while forcing the U.S. share down by two-
thirds. 172 The United States lodged a complaint with GAT[ under the
new Code. 173 Consultations failed and a panel was set up to examine
the case.
The first contention raised in this case was whether wheat flour is
a primary or a non-primary product. 174 This is a very important point
because as we have seen, the Code contains an outright prohibition of
export subsidies on non-primary products. It is to be noted that in its
written complaint the United States assumed that wheat flour is a pri-
mary product.1 75 However, during the hearings the United States as-
sumed that it was a non-primary product.' 76 The panel did not discuss
the issue because it had not been raised by the United States in its
written complaint. This attitude has been criticized by some scholars,
who note that neither the Understanding of 1979 nor the Declaration
of 1982 preclude contending parties from raising new points during
the procedure which were not included in the written complaints.
1 77
Another contested point was the determination of the "previous
representative period." 17 8 As we have seen, Article 10(2)(c) of the
Code establishes that this period "shall normally be the three most re-
cent calendar years in-which normal market conditions existed."' 79
The United States contended that the panel should choose the three
years prior to the establishment of the CAP, alleging that the CAP had
171 Six of the complaints in the petition were: Export Subsidies on Wheat Flour (Subsi-
dies Code), Export Subsidies on Pasta (Subsidies Code), Export Subsidies on Poultry (Subsi-
dies Code), Production Subsidies on Canned Fruit and Raisins (GATT, art. XXIII), Export
Subsidies on Sugar (Subsidies Code), and Preferential Tariff on Citrus Products (GATT, art.
XXIII). See Hudec, Legal Issues, supra note 169, at 32. See also How Export Subsidies May Spark a
Trade War, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 5, 1981, 27, 27-28 (noting that complaints were triggered by EC
subsidies); The Next Transatlantic War, THE ECONOMIsT, Nov. 20, 1982, at 33; Subsidies Threaten
a Trade War in Food, supra note 168, at 138 (discussing complaints in context of general trade
disagreements between the EC and the United States).
172 See Neil D. Hamilton, US and EEC Moving Toward Trade War over Export Subsidies, NA-
TIONAL L. J., May 3, 1982, at 32.
173 See Massimo Coccia, Settlement of Disputes in GATT Under the Subsidies Code: Two Panel
Reports on EEC Export Subsidies, 16 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 25 (1986).
174 Id.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See id. However, the panel, taking into account that there was a precedent on point
and that the fact that wheat flour is a primary product is so obvious that even the United
States had assumed it in its written complaint, applied a simple principle of procedural econ-
omy. See discussion on French export subsidies on wheat flour, supra note 79.
178 Coccia, supra note 173.
179 Code, supra note 120, art. 10(2)(c).
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altered "normal market conditions." 80 Nevertheless, the panel held
that since trade in wheat flour had been affected by the use of subsi-
dies by different governments in various periods, it was reasonable to
take into account the three years prior to the complaint (1977-
1980) .181
The most anticipated issue was how the panel would approach the
interpretation of the notion of "more than equitable share." Following
the new criteria introduced in the Code the panel examined whether
the EC's exports had displaced U.S. exports in particular markets. The
analysis revealed that during the representative period (1977-1980),
U.S. and EC shares of world trade in wheat flour had been twenty-five
percent and fifty-eight percent, respectively. In 1981, the U.S. share
fell down to twenty-one percent (minus four percent), while the EC
share grew to sixty-six percent (plus eight percent). In addition, twelve
out of seventeen markets analyzed revealed a substantial decline of the
U.S. share coupled with a steady increase of that of the EC. In addi-
tion, nine markets showed a clear proportionality between U.S. decline
and EC progress.'8 2 In spite of these developments, the panel was un-
able to reach a definite conclusion. In light of the "difficulties inher-
ent in the concept of more than equitable share," 8 3 it held that
notwithstanding the important increase of EC wheat flour exports, it
had not been possible to establish a causal relationship between EC
growth and U.S. decline. It has been argued that "a panel should try to
attenuate those difficulties instead of using them as an excuse for not
making a decision." 8 4 This view ignores the nature and the limita-
tions of GATT dispute settlement machinery, and the fact that in the
past, "creative" interpretations have been criticized by the Contracting
Parties. 1 5 In addition, "experience shows that dispute settlement pro-
ceedings cannot substitute for an absent consensus on substantive
rules."' 8 6
The EC Export Refunds on Wheat Flour case was just the begin-
ning of a series of cases that undermined GAT T dispute settlement
machinery. Hilt's comments on the performance of the GATT dispute
settlement process in recent years are illustrative: "Recently a few seri-
ous deadlocks in the GATT D[ispute] S[ettlement] procedures, all in
180 Coccia, supra note 173.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See Coccia, supra note 173, at 21 (quoting GATT Dispute Panel Report on US. Complaint
Concerning E.G. Subsidies to Wheat Farmers, 18 U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 22, at 899 (Mar.
8, 1983)).
184 Id.
185 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strengthening GATT Procedures for Settling Trade Disputes,
11 WORLD EcoN. 55, 72 (1988).
186 Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, The GATT Rules for Industrial Subsidies and CD and the New
GATT Round: The Weather and the Seeds, in THE NEw GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 219, 230 (Meihard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 1991).
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the field of agriculture and especially under the Subsidies Code were
sufficient to discredit the most effective and unique DS system that
economic organizations operating on a worldwide basis have ever ex-
perienced."' 8 7 These cases revealed the inadequacy of GATT dispute
settlement mechanisms to solve the substantive policy issues that the
participants in the Tokyo Round were not able to resolve.
From a broader perspective, one could argue that since the EC
had been involved deeply in the negotiations, it could no longer con-
tend that the regime was illegitimate in its eyes. The real problem in
the Tokyo Round was that with regard to both industrial and agricul-
tural subsidies there was no real consensus either on the rules or on
the principles on which the norms were to stand.1 88 While the norms
on subsidies were regarded in the United States as legally binding
"norms of obligation," in the EC they seemed mere guidelines or
"norms of aspiration."1 89 In light of these considerations, the only op-
tion left to restore the "constraint function" of the GATT regime was to
put the agricultural policies of all Contracting Parties on the table and
to bargain on the policies themselves The panel itself suggested that
any solution to the export subsidies issue should be reached through
negotiations within the International Wheat Council or the GATT, and
that Article 10 of the Code could not be enforced unless its language
was reformed.' 90
IV. Negotiating the Substantive Issues: The Uruguay Round
A. The Ministerial Declaration of 1982 and Its Aftermath
The GATT Contracting Parties met at the Ministerial level for the
first time after completion of the Tokyo Round on November 29, 1982.
Noting that the multilateral trading system was seriously endangered,
they issued a Declaration,' 9 1 which included basically hortatory norms,
in which they addressed the most outstanding problems raised since
the end of the Tokyo Round.
As far as agriculture is concerned, the Contracting Parties under-
took "to bring agriculture more fully into the multilateral trading sys-
tem by improving the effectiveness of GATT rules, provisions and
187 Meinhard Hilf, EC and GA7T A European Proposal for Strengthening the GA7T Dispute
Settlement Procedures, in GATT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR A
STRONGER REGIME 63, 63 (Robert Rode ed., 1990).
188 In connection with industrial subsidies, Bourgeois has noted that,
whatever views one might have about the desirability of an optimal world eco-
nomic order, international legal rules to implement it are only really enforcea-
ble if they correspond to a genuine consensus of the Contracting Parties. Such
a consensus does not seem to exist with respect to subsidisation, because there
is no consensus on the policies for which subsidisation is an instrument.
Bourgeois, supra note 186, at 232.
189 JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 5, at 761.
190 See Boger, supra note 79, at 213-214.
191 Ministerial Declaration of 29 November 1982, 29 B.I.S.D. (GATT) 9 (1983).
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disciplines and through their common interpretation; to seek to im-
prove terms of access to markets; and to bring export competition
under greater discipline."192 Obviously, this was only rhetoric. Behind
the scenes, there were bitter discussions between the Community and
the United States. While the latter accused the EC of using export
refunds to steal U.S. markets in third countries, the EC argued that the
problems faced by U.S. farmers were not a consequence of CAP, but a
result of the recession, the overvaluation of the dollar, the high inter-
est rates, new world market developments, and the U.S. embargo on
the USSR. In any event, "since the violent verbal attack by U.S. repre-
sentatives in the 1982 GAT1 Ministerial meeting, it appears that sup-
pressing these restitutions has become the main U.S. objective in
agricultural trade negotiations." 193
Shortly after the Ministerial Declaration, the United States de-
cided to leave verbal attacks aside and adopt a more expedient course
of action. The United States and the EC had decided'to undertake a
joint study to find solutions to their frictions, but the meetings were
fruitless. At the beginning of December 1982, the Department of Agri-
culture was "preparing a plan and package in response to the Euro-
pean stance on agricultural subsidies-updating its list of U.S. exports
which might be subsidized." 94 In January of 1983, John Block, the
Secretary of Agriculture, "was reported to be pressing President Rea-
gan 'to fight fire with fire.'"195 As a result, by the end of January "the
first salvo or 'shot across the bow' from the [United States] came with
the announced sale of one million metric tons of wheat flour to Egypt
at less than the market price, a sale which completely eliminated the
Europeans from the world's largest wheat flour market." 96 The
United States deliberately attacked a French market, considering the
French government to be the main upholder of the CAP. tg7 Some
interpreted this action as a provocation to induce the EC to bring a
complaint in GATT against the United States, arguing that if the EC
had won the case it would have opened a door for the United States to
challenge its own export refund schemes.198 Instead,. the Community
reacted by selling one million metric tons of wheat to China. 99
In the midst of this confrontation, the conclusions of the U.S./EC
Wheat Flour Panel report, discussed in Part III, came as an outrage in
the United States, which eventually requested a review of the panel's
192 Thirty-Eighth Session at Ministerial Level, 29 B.I.S.D. (GATT) 9, 11-12 (1983).
193 Petit, The Agricultural Trade Confrontation, supra note 74, at 189.
194 Butler, supra note 74, at 117.
195 Id. at 115.
196 Marsha A. Echols, Just Friends: The U.S.-EEC Agricultural Export Subsidies Standoff, 77
PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 119, 128 (1983).
197 Michel Petit, Conflitos entre las estrategias agroalimentarias de los Estados Unidos y de la
Comunidad Economica Europea, 235 RmsA DE Esruoros AGRO-SOcALmEs 267, 272 (1986).
198 Boger, supra note 79, at 222 n.279 (citingJulian Heron, Washington trade attorney).
199 GARY C. HUEBAUER &JoANNA S. ERa, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 40-41 (1984).
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decision. 200 In light of the inefficacy of the GATT regulation, the
United States adopted numerous measures directed to foster agricul-
tural exports.20 1 What ensued was a subsidy war and an escalation of
the trade conflicts related to agricultural products, a detailed descrip-
tion of which falls outside the scope of this paper. However, it is worth
noting here that as a result of this escalation, in 1984, for example, the
United States and the EC were spending approximately $35 billion in
agricultural subsidies.202
B. The Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este: The Negotiation
Approach
On September 20, 1986, the Contracting Parties to the GATT
launched in Punta del Este (Uruguay) a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations. Both the number of participating countries
(ninety-two at the beginning of the negotiations) and the issues in-
cluded in the Declaration revealed that the Uruguay Round would be
the most ambitious in GATT's history. Its basic objectives would be to
strengthen and extend the coverage of the GATT system-the agenda
included new areas such as Services, Trade Related Investment Meas-
ures (TRIMS), Intellectual Property and Agriculture; to reduce non-
tariff barriers to trade; to increase the role of developing countries in
GATT; and, generally, to restore respect to GATr. 203
One of the most important features of the Declaration was the
inclusion of agriculture. The world's crisis in agricultural trade and
the escalation of the conflict between the United States and the EC
gave agriculture a privileged place in the agenda of negotiations. In
April 1986, James Baker had claimed "that the [U.S.]-European Com-
munity disputes on agricultural trade posed the biggest threat to the
world's free trading system."204 The growing international tension and
the high cost of farm policies prompted the Contracting Parties, for
the first time in the negotiating history of the GATT, to put all forms of
agricultural protection on the table.20 5
200 Boger, supra note 79, at 223.
201 For example, the Bonus Incentive Commodity Export Program (BICEP), since the
1985 Farm Bill a part of the Export Enhancement Program, the Export Credit Guarantee
Programs (GSM-102 and GSM-103), Marketing Loans, the Targeted Export Assistance
(TEA), and an expansion of the PL-480 Program were among the measures. See CoMMISSION
EEC, REPORT ON UNITED STATES TRADE BARRIERS AND UNFAIR PRACTICES 28-33 (1991); see also
JEAN P. CHARVET, LA GUERRE fu BLE 53, 53-56, 157 (1988).
202 Barbara Insel, A World Awash in Grain, 63 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 892, 900 (1985).
203 See Ministerial Declaration ofPunta delEste, supra note 6; THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HAND.
BOOK OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski
eds., 1987) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
204 Rachel McCulloch, Macroeconomic Policy and Trade Performance: International Implica-
tions of U.S. Budget Deficits, in ISSUES IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS 351 (Robert E. Baldwin et al.
eds., 1988).
205 Gary P. Sampson, Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,
1989 PROC. WORLD BANK ANN. CONF. ON DEV. ECON. 21, 50.
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According to the Punta del Este Declaration, "negotiations shall
aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring
all measures affecting import access and export competition under
strengthened and more operationally effective GAT' rules and disci-
plines."20 6 The negotiations would focus on three areas: improving
market access, export competition, and minimizing the adverse effects
of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations on trade in agriculture. 2 7
This was a dramatic change of approach with respect to past GATT
practice. Although at the inception of GATT the rules were written to
fit the agricultural programs then in existence, now the process would
be the reverse. The Contracting Parties now would negotiate reforms
in their agricultural policies to bring them in line with the basic GATT
principles.20 8 During the Tokyo Round the Contracting Parties tried
to subject their policies to stringent regulation without coping with the
roots of the problem; now, the regulation would be coupled with a
negotiation of the substantive issues.
As far as agricultural subsidies are concerned, the negotiations
would take place within the "Agriculture Group," rather than within
the "Subsidies Group."20 9 This is a consequence of the approach se-
lected: direct bargaining over the agricultural policies. Thus, the re-
sults reached in the "Subsidies Group" would require adjustment
according to the reforms made by the "Agriculture Group."2 10
C. Negotiation Context
The United States and the EC have dominated international agri-
cultural trade negotiations since the creation of the latter. In fact, dur-
ing the Tokyo Round important parts of the negotiations were dealt
with among the two giants and later presented to the other Con-
tracting Parties as a fait accompli l To prevent this situation from oc-
curring again, a group encompassing both developed and developing
countries representing twenty-two percent of world agricultural ex-
ports was created in 1986 under the leadership of Australia. The
group is generally known as the Cairns Group, after the Australian city
where it held its first meeting. Any final accord in the Uruguay Round
would have to accommodate the interests of the United States, the EC,
206 As Hathaway has noted, "what is omitted from the Declaration is also telling. No
reference is made to the uniqueness of agriculture or its special adjustment problems or to
food security or the special role of food trade." HATHAWAY, supra note 47, at 123.
207 Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este, supra note 6.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 24.
210 See INTERNTINAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, BRINGING AGRICUL-
TURE INTO THE GATT: THE COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN AGRICULTURE
18-19 (1990).
211 SeeJock A. Finayson & Ann Weston, The GAT, Middle Powers, and the Uruguay Round,
5 MIDDLE POWERS IN THE INr'L Svs. 37 (1990).
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and the Cairns Group. Another country to be taken into account is
Japan, given the strategic importance of agriculture to its economy.
For a better understanding of the evolution of the negotiations, it
is worth outlining here the negotiation interests of each block at the
beginning of the Uruguay Round.
1. The United States
Everyone wonders why the United States attaches so much impor-
tance to a sector that accounts for only two percent of its Gross Domes-
tic Product.212 The response to this question lies in a mixture of
commercial, ideological, and political factors.
The United States negotiating strategy is conditioned by its sup-
posed comparative advantage in agricultural production. According to
this argument, the reduction of agricultural protectionism would pro-
duce a decline in EC' exports, to the advantage of the United States. As
a consequence, the liberalization process would produce an important
number of newjobs in the United States.213 Although the comparative
advantage of the United States is generally admitted, some commenta-
tors hold that "those who have concluded that Europe is not a compet-
itive producer need think again." 214
From an ideological point of view, the desire to reduce agricul-
tural protectionism may be explained as a consequence of U.S. ne-
oliberal rhetoric. While the EC has consistently proposed
international commodity agreements in international trade negotia-
tions on agricultural trade, the United States has always rejected any
formal attempt to create cartels on ideological grounds. The creation
of cartels "probably opposes an 'anglo-saxon' approach, a priori favor-
ing market mechanisms, to an attitude, quite general on the European
continent, seeking a political solution when faced with a major conflict
of interests."215
The U.S. position is also explained by political considerations. We
have all heard of the legendary power of farm lobbies. In the United
States, agribusiness interests are very well organized to influence polit-
ical decisions. Congressmen receive financial contributions from farm
lobbyists, and also receive the support of specialized newspapers dur-
212 In 1988, agriculture accounted for 2% of the Gross Domestic Product in the United
States, 2.9% in the EC, 3% in Canada, 4.2% in Australia, and 8.4% in New Zealand. ALJERT
MASSOT I MARri, EL DERECHO AGRARIO, EL DERECHO AGROALIMENTARIO, Y EL DERECHO RuRAL
EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JuRInICO DE LA UNION EUROPEA 727 (1992).
213 See Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stem, Options for Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay
Round Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 17,
23 (Frank J. Macchiarola ed., 1990).
214 Insel, supra note 202, at 895. Likewise, Bergman notes that in some products the
EEC is more competitive than the U.S. See Dennis Bergman, Les /lations Commeriales
Agricoles entre la aE et les Etats-Unis, in LEs RELATIONS COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ETATS-UNIS
301, 302 (Jacques Bourrinet ed., 1987).
215 Petit, The Agricultural Trade Confrontation, supra note 74, at 190.
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ing the elections.216
The prime target of U.S. negotiators has been export subsidies, in
contrast to the EC, which has been seeking a global negotiation of all
forms of support to agriculture. The U.S. stand is explained by the fact
that unlike the EC, the United States has, during the last decades,
based its agricultural policy on deficiency payments and a wide array of
indirect subsidies to farmers. Thus its main interest has not been
global negotiation, but the export refunds granted by the Community.
2. The European Community
When the Uruguay Round was launched, the EC had already initi-
ated a reform of the CAP.21 7 In spite of these reforms, the Community
was very reluctant to include agriculture on the agenda218 for a
number of different reasons.
The first factor which comes to mind when trying to explain the
Community's stand is the rigidity of its decision-making process. This
rigidity has been an obstacle to the reform of the CAP for many
years, 219 and has prevented the Commission from voicing its opinion
in international fora. In Professor Weiler's words, "the story of the EC
in international trade is that of a giant in chains who has not really
been able to translate its economic power effectively onto the interna-
tional arena."220 The agricultural trade negotiations have been hin-
dered by the deep differences between the Commission and the
Council of Ministers. The weight given to national governments in
Community decisions reduces the Commission's leeway. This would
partly explain the defensive position of the Community in the U.S./EC
agricultural confrontation. 22'
216 See Petit, Conflitos entre las estrategias agroalimentarias, supra note 197, at 274-78 (dis-
cussing U.S. policy making in the agricultural sector).
217 See, e.g., Avery, supra note 3 at 481, 482.
218 Although an ambiguous agreement was reached at the Ministerial Meeting of 1982 to
study the problems connected with agricultural trade, the Community, under French pres-
sure, insisted that this did not mean that the EC would initiate negotiations on trade liberali-
zation in this sector. Later, the mounting pressure of the United States, the Cairns Group,
and the pro-reformists within the EC, coupled with the spillover effects of agricultural dis-
putes, prompted the Community to include agriculture in the Uruguay Round agenda. See
ANNA MURPHY, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 112
(1990).
219 MICHAEL TRACY & HEINO VON MEYER, ALTERNATIVE SUPPORT MEASURES FOR AGRICUL-
TuRE 82 (1987).
220 SeeJoseph Weiler, Remarks on European Trade, 1992: Fortress or Partnership?, 83 PROC.
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 334, 334-35 (1989).
221 Catherine Pivot, Logiques Compar~es des Politiques Agricoles Americaine et Eunsp&ne, in LEs
RELATIONS COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENE ETATS-UNIS, at 193, 205-06 (Jacques Bourrinet ed.,
1987). In addition, Patterson has stated that "the most serious impact on the trading system
growing out of the very nature of the EC and its decision-making structure is that it seems to
have built-in, and serious, bias toward protectionism. This is most clearly seen in the area
where the EC has gone furthest in establishing a common policy: agriculture." Gardner
Patterson, The European Community as a Threat to the System, in TRADE POLICv IN TmE 1980's 223,
227 (William R. Cline ed., 1983).
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As in the United States, EC pressure groups also have an impor-
tant bearing on the decision-making process. Since lobbies are not as
well organized as in the United States, they operate mainly on national
governments. In the past, the establishment of formal consultation
mechanisms between the Commission and domestic pressure groups
was rejected, because a risk existed that a formal involvement of these
groups would harm the already complex decision-making process.222
The EC Commission, however, has just approved a document which
may be the point of departure for the regulation of lobbies within the
EC.
Another factor to be taken into account is the structure of Euro-
pean agriculture. It should be noted that in 1980 the land in agricul-
tural use in the United States was 430 million hectares, while in the EC
the figure stood at 102 million; however, the EC had 6.5 million farms
and 8.7 million farmers, in contrast to the United States, where there
were only 2.6 million farms and 3.5 million farmers.223 The number of
farms and the high percentage of jobs directly related to agriculture
caused the EC to adopt a cautious stand in the negotiations. As is well
known, there are not only agricultural interests lurking behind the
CAP, but also rural development, demographic, and environmental
concerns.
Finally, the Community knows that it has enormous bargaining
power because, in spite of the accusations of being protectionist, the
EC is the leading importer of agricultural products in the world.2 24 In
fact, "most observers link power within GATT to the size of domestic
markets to which improved access can be offered in a trade bargaining
context."225
3. Cairns Group
As noted, the Cairns Group includes fourteen countries, which
represent twenty-two percent of world agricultural exports, and which
name themselves "fair traders." 226 It is an ambiguous and heteroge-
nous group that encompasses both developed countries (Australia,
New Zealand, Canada) and developing countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Thailand, Colombia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Uruguay). The participation of Canada in the group
stresses its heterogeneity, taking into account that its agricultural pol-
222 MuRPHY, supra note 218, at 126. But see a document recently approved by the EC
Commission and published in Un didlogo abierto y estructurado entre la Comisi6n y los grupos de
inters, 1993 OJ. (C 63).
223 Luis V. BARCELO &JOSE M.G. ALVAREZ-COQUE, EL FUTURO DE LA POLxrtCA AcluCOLA
COMUN Y LA ECONOMIA ESPANOLA 202 (1987) (citing statistics from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture and OECD).
224 See OCDE, supra note 4.
225 Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 12, at 312-313.
226 CHALMIN, le GATT et l'Agriculture, PROBLEMES ECONOMIQUES, Nov. 28, 1990, at 22.
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icy is quite protectionist. 227
The Group was created to carry out concerted action in the nego-
tiations, increasing their bargaining power in front of the EC and the
United States. Note that this group was created under the leadership
of Australia, a country that has brought several complaints under
GATT against agricultural subsidies. The countries within the Cairns
Group consider that they are the real victims of the quarrels between
the EC and the United States.228 They support a dramatic liberaliza-
tion of world trade in agriculture. In practice, their position is very
close to the U.S. stance. 229
4. Japan
The Japanese model is close to that of the EC. They maintain the
most protectionist agricultural policy in the world, especially in con-
nection with rice.230 This is due to food security concerns, but also to
the political progress of the agricultural lobby, NOKYO, within the pe-
culiar Japanese electoral system.231 NOKYO represents over five mil-
lion farmers and has an important influence over some political
parties. 232
D. Evolution of the Negotiations
The first proposal containing specific measures aimed at the liber-
alization of world trade in agricultural products was submitted by the
United States on July 6, 1987. Its obvious focus was agricultural export
subsidies. The most salient measures proposed by the United States
were as follows: (1) agricultural subsidies: to eliminate within a ten-
year period all subsidies which directly or indirectly affect agricultural
trade; (2) export subsidies: to freeze and progressively eradicate,
within a ten-year period, the quantities exported by using export subsi-
dies; (3) import access: to eliminate, within a ten-year period, all non-
tariff barriers to imports; only tariffs would be allowed; and (4) sanitary
and phytosanitary regulations: to harmonize national regulations in
order to reduce the adverse effects of national legislation on interna-
tional trade.
This offer was considered in Community circles as a bluff. In fact,
if the U.S. proposition had gone through, the GATT norms on agricul-
tural trade would have been much more stringent than those regulat-
ing trade in industrial products. In addition, the U.S. Administration
would have had serious problems in getting it accepted by Congress.
227 Id,
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
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The proposal should be read in the context of the U.S. negotiating
strategy, but it was clearly unrealistic. As one commentator put it, the
so-called "double-zero" option "avait au moins le mirite de frapper les
espits."
2 33
The proposal was strongly opposed by other Contracting Parties,
namely the EC and Japan. They argued that the negotiations should
take into account the special factors affecting agriculture, like food se-
curity concerns, the dependence on weather conditions, and the dif-
ferent structure of agriculture in different countries.23 4.
While U.S. attention concentrated on EC export subsidies, the lat-
ter made clear from the outset that the negotiations should embrace
all measures affecting agricultural trade, not only export subsidies.23 5
In addition, the Community highlighted that agriculture negotiations
cannot be isolated from negotiations in other sectors. In Willy De
Clerq's words, "the concept of globality is essential to the success of the
new round."23 6
On October 26, 1987, the EC submitted its proposal, which con-
trasted sharply with the U.S. document. The Community presented a
two-stage plan, which called for short-term internationally coordinated
actions to stabilize the most imbalanced markets, such as dairy prod-
ucts, sugar, and cereals. At a later time, the Contracting Parties would
seek to reduce the level of government support to agriculture. The
plan to "coordinate actions" was in line with the "cartel-oriented" ap-
proach held traditionally by the EC, which has always been opposed by
the United States.
In contrast, the proposal presented by the Cairns Group the same
day was modeled after the U.S. document. Put briefly, its basic objec-
tives were the elimination of "all import and export restrictions and all
domestic subsidies with an impact on trade. Only measures for infra-
structure improvement, disaster relief and.., direct income support
to farmers and consumers would be allowed."23 7
Japan presented its proposal in December 1987.238 As already
noted, the main concern of the Japanese was the protection of their
rice production. Accordingly, Japan's document included principles
similar to those submitted by the EC. It emphasized the non-economic
objectives of farm policies, namely rural development, environmental
quality, and food security. 23 9
233 Id. at 20.
234 See GATI, The Uruguay Round File: Agriculture, 48 Focus (GATr Information Service,
Geneva) 3, 6 (1987).
235 See EC Details Plan for GATT Talks on Agriculture, EUROPE, Nov. 1987, at 16.
236 Id.
237 Carlisle F. Runge, The Assault on Agricultural Protectionism, 67 FOREIGN AF. 133, 145
(1988).
238 Id.
239 Id. at 146.
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During the numerous meetings held by the "Agriculture Group"
from December 1987 to December 1988, the four main negotiators
stuck to their initial positions, making any progress impossible. While
the negotiations were under way, trade disputes related to agriculture
were a recurring issue. 240 In addition, the elections scheduled in
France and in the United States hindered the negotiation process. It is
well known that no government is willing to make concessions in trade
talks when elections lie ahead.
The GATT Contracting Parties decided to schedule a meeting at
the Ministerial level to evaluate the progress made and to give the ne-
gotiations political impulse. The meeting, which has come to be
known in GATI jargon as the "Midterm Review," took place in Mon-
treal in December 1988.241 The discussions on agricultural trade were
dominated by the United States and the EC, which were unable to
smooth over their differences. While the former insisted on the "elimi-
nation" of trade distorting measures, the latter preferred the word "re-
duction."242 The efforts to find a word acceptable to both Contracting
Parties were futile and ridiculous, taking into account that an agree-
ment on the substance, not on the language, is what was lacking. 243
The lack of agreement about the reduction of agricultural subsi-
dies was one of the most striking features of the Montreal Meeting. 244
As a response to EC and U.S. intransigence, some developing coun-
tries blocked the whole Round.245 To overcome the stalemate, the
Contracting Parties agreed to a new meeting in Geneva in April 1989.
In preparation for the gathering, the GAT Director General held vari-
ous meetings with the Community and the United States, while the
former's Commissioners Ray McSharry (Agriculture) and Frans An-
driessen (External Relations) gathered with their American counter-
parts, Clayton Yeutter and Carla Hills.246 These meetings produced a
compromise agreement on the long-term objective of the reforms,
which should represent "a 'substantial progressive reduction' in agri-
cultural support."247
As a result of these previous meetings, in Geneva the Contracting
Parties reached an agreement on a twenty-point document,248 which
240 For example, on September 22, 1988, the EC and Australia lodged two complaints in
GATT against the sugar import regime of the United States. See GATT, United States Sugar-
Trade Policy, 57 Focus (GAIT Information Service, Geneva) 1, 1-2 (1988).
241 See MuRpw, supra note 218.
242 Id. at 119.
243 Id.
244 See Stephen Wolicock &Jilyan Kelly, GATT. The Price of False Expectations, THE Wotmn
TODAY, March 1989, at 50.
245 Gilbert R. Winham, GATT and the International Trade Regime, 45 INT'LJ. 796, 808-809
(1990).
246 See Muu'HY, supra note 218, at 119.
247 Id. at 119-120.
248 The main features of the document may be summarized as follows:
a) Long-term Elements: The long-term goals are to establish a fair and market-oriented agri-
1993]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
provided a framework for future discussions and brought U.S./EC po-
sitions closer to the long-term objective of the negotiations. The Con-
tracting Parties undertook to submit before December 1989 new
proposals for negotiations based on the legal framework accorded in
Geneva.
The proposals submitted some months later revealed that the
agreement reached in April was purely cosmetic. 249 Although the
United States abandoned the so-called "double-zero" option, its propo-
sal was considered in Brussels as a direct attack on the CAP. 25 0 The
cultural trading system (Point 5), and to provide for substantial progressive reductions in
agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time (Point 6). To
attain these goals, GATT norms should be strengthened; b) Short-term Elements: The agree-
ment contains a standstill provision, according to which the Contracting Parties undertake
not to exceed the current levels of protection (Point 14); c) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regu-
lations: the Contracting Parties approved a work program to harmonize national regulations
(Point 20); and d) Developing Countries: The agreement recognizes the need for a special
treatment of developing countries (Point 8), which are not expected to subscribe to Part B
(Short-Term Elements).
249 The United States document, submitted on October 25, 1989, included the following
proposals:
a) Market access: All non-tariff barriers to trade (including EC's variable levies) would be
converted into tariffs, which would be reduced down to zero or "a low level"; b) Export
Competition: Export subsidies would be eliminated and prohibited within a five-year period.
Only "authentic food aid" would escape this prohibition; c) Internal Support: the central
idea is to eliminate within a ten-year period all forms of price support and support measures
linked to production. In connection with domestic subsidies, the United States proposed a
regulation inspired by the so-called traffic light approach. Some policies would be sup-
pressed (red light), notably all support measures linked to prices or production; other poli-
cies would be subject to GATT's discipline (yellow light); and some policies would be
authorized (green light), namely income support measures delinked from production, envi-
ronmental programs, and food aid; d) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: New procedures
for notification, consultation and dispute settlement would be established; and
e) Developing Countries: Although a different and special treatment is envisaged for less
developing countries, advanced developing countries will have to comply with the new regu-
lation. U.S. Trade Representative, Internal Proposal to GAIT (Apr. 1989) (on file with
author).
As expected, the document presented by the Cairns Group on November 27, 1989 was
very ambitious. Thus the liberalization process would be applied to all measures, all prod-
ucts, and all Contracting Parties. The main points of the proposal were similar to the U.S.
document. It is worth noting here that it proposed the modification of Article XVI of the
General Agreement (and its counterparts in the Code) in order to prohibit all export
subsidies.
In contrast to the preceding proposals, the first page of the EC's document, which was
submitted on December 20, 1989, emphasized the importance of the specific characteristics
of agriculture production, its dependence on weather conditions, price fluctuations, and the
like. The EC opposed in principle the "tariffication option," arguing that under this ap-
proach the U.S. deficiency payments would escape the regulation. In addition, while the
United States focused on the elimination of frontier measures (namely variable levies), the
EC emphasized that the total internal support should be calculated, and then reduced using
the so-called Global Measure of Support. EC, Internal Proposal to GATT (Dec. 20, 1989) (on
file with author).
In its proposal, Japan argued that taking into account the non-economic concerns re-
lated to agriculture (e.g., food security), it would be difficult to eliminate all support meas-
ures. It considered that a reduction of the levels of support would be constructive and
realistic, but it did not propose specific measures or deadlines.
250 See Rechazo fmontal de la CA al plan de EE.UU, LA VANGUARDIA, Oct. 27, 1989, at 78.
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United States and the Cairns Group warned that the negotiations
would not go through unless the EC proposal was improved. These
new squabbles, coupled with the problems raised in other areas, re-
sulted in a new deadlock of the negotiations that lasted until the fall of
1990. Taking into account that the Uruguay Round was scheduled to
come to an end in December of 1990, the prospects for an agreement
were very bleak.
In November 1990, in spite of the fierce opposition from agricul-
tural pressure groups, the EC Commission managed to have the Coun-
cil approve a new proposal,25 1 according to which the EC would
reduce its agricultural subsidies by thirty percent.2 52 Once again, the
proposal fell short of the expectations of both the United States and
the Cairns Group.
On December 3, 1990, the GAT Contracting Parties launched
the Brussels meeting that was supposed to close the Uruguay Round
while 30,000 farmers rioted in the streets. 253 The United States and
the Cairns Group demanded precise commitments on export subsidies
and market access; the EC insisted on a global negotiation. After four
days of tense discussions, the negotiations collapsed.25 4 The GATras-
trophe had been consummated.
251 The proposal had been strongly opposed by the Council of Ministers for one month.
When it passed, European agricultural lobbies said that the Commission had betrayed them.
See Les Douze d'accord pour riduire de 30% les Subventions Agricoles, Supplement D'Agromonde
Service (EuROPouLrQuE), No. 317, at 1 (Nov. 23, 1990).
252 The central theme of the new proposal was a reduction by 30% of the support and
protection for the principal products (this means not all products). This would include: a)
A 30% reduction of the support to agriculture, using the Global Measure of Support; b) the
"tariffication" of some frontier measures (although the proposal included a corrective mecha-
nism which was considered by the United States as a new form of variable levy); and c) a
concomitant adjustment of export refunds. EC, Internal Proposal to GATT (Nov, 7, 1990)
(on file with author).
Note that the Community avoided any precise commitment on export subsidies. As Mr.
Mac Sharry said in the European Parliament, "the Community has made it clear that it is not
prepared to single out export refunds for particular treatment." Mr. Mac Sharry, Member of
the Commission with Responsibility for Agriculture, Community Offer on Agriculture in the Uru-
guay Round, delivered at Nov. Plenary Sess. of the European Parliament, Strasbourg 5 (Nov.
22, 1990).
253 See La CE plantea en el GATT un pacto global para salvar el escollo agrbla, LA VANGuARDIA,
Dec. 4, 1990, at 57.
254 The Contracting Parties met in Brussels without a basis for negotiating. On Decem-
ber 4, the EC tried to explain its proposal, but the negotiators were unable to reach an
agreement on the negotiation method. The EC accused the United States of having trans-
formed the Uruguay Round into a farm conference, while the latter rejected the EC's global
approach. After much heated discussion, the Brussels meeting came to an end without an
agreement. Manuel Estap6, Ultimdtum de veinticuatro horas para evitar el fracaso de la Ronda
Uruguay, LA VANGUARDL, Dec. 6, 1990, at 56.
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V. The Quest for a Compromise: Dunkel's Document of
December 1991
A. Introduction
The collapse of the talks in December 1990 was followed by a
proliferation of trade disputes involving agricultural products.2 5 5 Pres-
ident Bush proposed a $1.2 billion export subsidy program, a gesture
that was interpreted as a maneuver to put pressure on the Commu-
nity.25 6 In addition, the uncertainty as to the final outcome of the
Round was stressed by the fact that the U.S. Executive's negotiating
mandate was due to expire in May 1991.
In this uncertain context, in February 1991 the EC Commission
presented a document on the reform of the CAP which would be the
point of departure for the dramatic reform accorded by the EC Coun-
cil of Ministers in May 1992.257 The problem was that the compromise
struck within the EC Council was so delicately balanced that the leeway
left for further negotiations was severely curtailed. In any event, this
move eased the tensions with the United States, which welcomed the
proposed reforms with surprise. 258 In fact, some interpreted this docu-
ment as a political gesture aimed at helping the United States Execu-
255 See GATT, Agricultural Disputes Dominate GATT Agenda, 78 Focus (GATT Information
Service, Geneva) 1, 1 (1991).
256 See CEE/Etats Unis: la guerre de subventions d l'exportation des produites agricoles continue a
faire rage, EVROPOLITIQUE, Jan. 30, 1991, at 2.
257 See Desarrollo y Futuro de la PAC, COM (91) 258 final (1991). The basic purpose of
this text was to provoke a deep reflection within Community circles as to what the future of
the CAP should be, in the light of mounting budgetary constraints and increasing trade con-
flicts with third countries. The first part of the document exposes the main reasons militat-
ing against the maintenance of the traditional principles. It explains how the scheme,
designed while the EC was running a deficit in most agricultural products, was no longer
useful to fulfill the objectives set forth in Article 39 of the EC Treaty. The reforms adopted in
the past had failed to improve the situation. Thus, according to the Commission, the only
solution lay not in another set of partial reforms, but in a deep revision of the objectives and
principles of the CAP.
The document recognizes the importance of farmers for the preservation of the environ-
ment and rural development. As a consequence, it calls for instruments designed to support
farmers' income, taking into account both production and environmental considerations.
The central idea of the document is to substitute price support mechanisms by direct income
measures.
In its final remarks, the Commission made clear that the only inviable option was the
maintenance of the status quo. If the CAP is not modified, the situation of both the markets
and the budget will be unbearable.
The Commission outlined the details of its projected reforms in another document sub-
mitted in July 1991. See Evoluci6n y futuro de la PAC - Documento de Reflexi6n de la Comis-
i6n, COM (91) 100 final (1991). In the fall of the same year, the Commission submitted to
the Council the legislative proposals which, after much debate, led to the dramatic reform
approved by the Council of Ministers in May 1992. See Community Agrees on Radical Reform of
the CAP, 707 COMMON MKT. REP. 1 (1992); The CAP and the GATT, THE ECONOMIST, May 23,
1992, at 20; ALBERT MASSOT I MARTI, Hacia una Nueva PAC, CINco DIAs, Jan. 14, 1993, at 2;
MASSOT I MARTI, EL DERECHO AcRAjuo, supra note 212, at 731-820 (commenting on the
reforms).
258 See AGRo EUROPA, Feb. 18, 1991, at 1.
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tive to have the fast-track extended by Congress, 25 9 which eventually
renewed fast-track authority in May 1991.260 The new climate brought
about by the EC internal reforms and the renewal of the fast-track gave
the negotiations some stimulus.
In December 1991, the GATT Director-General came up with a
document entitled "Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations," 26' which was meant
to be the basis for a definitive accord. It is worth pausing here to ex-
amine the main features of the text on "Agriculture" (Section L).262
B. The Proposed Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
The document has four parts: "Uruguay Round Agreement on Ag-
riculture" (Part A), "Agreement on Modalities for the Establishment of
Specific Binding Commitments Under the Reform Programme" (Part
B), "Decision by Contracting Parties on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures" (Part C), and the "Declaration on Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme
on Net Food-Importing Developing Countries" (Part D). Because they
are central to the main theme of this paper, Parts A and B will be
analyzed briefly.
An overview of the text reveals four major features. First, unlike
past GATT norms on agricultural export subsidies, the document con-
tains more than rhetoric. It includes specific binding commitments in
three important areas-market access, domestic support, and export
competition. Second, the text adds a new element to GATT's institu-
tional structure-a Committee on Agriculture. Third, the document
takes into account the distinctive problems of developing countries,
especially the least developed countries. Fourth, the proposed agree-
ment should be understood not as a point of arrival, but as a point of
departure in a long reform process.
With regard to the first feature, the document prescribes that the
Contracting Parties should submit lists of specific commitments on
market access, domestic support, and export competition before
March 1, 1992,263 which would be annexed to the Uruguay Round Pro-
tocol to the General Agreement. 26 4 In connection with market access,
the document takes up the "tariffication option" proposed by the
United States. This means that all non-tariff barriers, such as quantita-
tive import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices,
259 See AGRO EUROPA, Feb. 25, 1991, at 2.
260 See Uruguay and Apple Pie, THE ECONOMIST, June 1, 1991, at 13.
261 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA Dec. 20, 1991, [hereinafter Draft Final Act].
262 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L; see also MASSOT i MARTS, EL DERECHO AcRARIo,
supra note 212, at 706-23.
263 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 21.
264 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 3.
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discretionary import licensing, state trading enterprises, voluntary ex-
port restraints, and the like, shall be converted into tariff equivalents.
The level of tariff equivalents resulting from this process shall consti-
tute the base level for the implementation of reduction commitments
on market access.265 According to the document, "ordinary customs
duties, including those resulting from tariffication, shall be reduced,
from the year 1993 to 1999, on a simple average basis by thirty-six per-
cent with a minimum rate of reduction of fifteen percent for each
tariff line." 266 In addition, if there are no significant imports, mini-
mum access opportunities shall be established. 267 It is to be noted that
the proposed text includes a Special Safeguard Provision, which would
exclude the application in this context of Articles XIX(1)(a) and
XIX(3) of the General Agreement. 268
The domestic support reduction commitments shall be expressed
in terms of Aggregate Measurements of Support (AMS).269 When cal-
culation of the AMS is not practicable, Contracting Parties shall under-
take "equivalent commitments." 270 According to the proposed
agreement, all domestic support shall be reduced, from the year 1993
to the year 1999, by twenty percent, taking as the base period the years
1986 to 1988. However, there is a de minimis margin of five per-
cent.271 In order to take into account the reforms already undertaken
by the EC, "credit shall be allowed in respect of actions undertaken
since the year 1986."272
It is to be observed that the domestic support reduction commit-
ments do not apply to all domestic support measures. The measures
which meet the criteria set out in Annex 2 will be exempted from these
commitments. Annex 2 includes two "fundamental requirements" (ab-
265 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, annex 3, sec. A.
266 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 5.
267 These minimum access opportunities shall represent in the first year not less than
3% of corresponding consumption in the period 1993-1999 and shall be expanded to reach
5% by the end of the implementation period. Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B,
para. 5.
268 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 5.
269 Draft FinalAct, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 6. Annex 5 contains a detailed defini-
tion of the AMS. According to paragraph 1, the AMS
shall be calculated on a product-specific basis for each basic product (defined
as the product as close as practicable to the point of first sale) receiving market
price support, non-exempt direct payments, or any other subsidy not exempted
from the reduction commitment ("other non-exempt policies"). Support
which is non-product specific shall be totalled into one non-product-specific
AMS in total monetary terms.
Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, annex 5, para. 6-13.
270 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, annex 6 (explaining the criteria to determine
these commitments).
271 If domestic support subject to reduction does not exceed 5% of the total value of
production, the Contracting Parties will not be required to undertake the reduction of that
support. For developing countries the margin shall be 10%. Draft Final Act, supra note 261,
sec. L, pt. A, art. 6(4) & pt. B, para. 10.
272 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 8.
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sence of, or at most minimal, trade distortion effects or effects on pro-
duction) and two "basic criteria": "(i) the support in question shall be
provided through a publicly-funded government programme (includ-
ing government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from con-
sumers;273 and (ii) the support in question shall not have the effect of
providing price support to producers."274 In short, the purpose of
these provisions is to exempt from the reduction commitments those
measures that are decoupled from prices and production. The impor-
tance of these exemptions should not be underestimated. They in-
clude a wide array of measures such as research programs, training
services, inspection, marketing and infrastructural services, direct pro-
vision of Food Aid bought by the donor government at market prices,
income support decoupled from prices or volume of production (eligi-
bility shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria such as income,
status as a producer or landowner, or factor use or production level in
a defined and fixed base period), government financial participation
in income insurance and income safety-net programs, payments for re-
lief from natural disasters, producer retirement programs, payments
under environmental programs, and payments under regional assist-
ance programs.275 All these measures, if they meet the detailed crite-
ria prescribed in Annex 2, not only will be exempt from the reduction
comriitments, but also shall be considered as non-actionable for the
purposes of countervailing measures. 276
As far as export competition is concerned, Article 9 provides a list
of export subsidies which shall be subject to reduction commit-
ments. 2 77 Export subsidies included in the list shall be subject to budg-
273 Note that for GAT" purposes, aid which does not come from a government fund is
not a subsidy. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Draft Final Act, supra note
261, sec. I.
274 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, annex 2, para. 1.
275 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, annex 2, para. 2-13.
276 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 7(3). Annex 2 of the Draft Final Act
should be read in light of the criteria for non-actionable subsidies included in Part IV of the
draft Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Draft Final Act, supra note 261,
sec. I, 9-12.
277 The following subsidies are subject to reduction commitments:
(a) The provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, includ-
ing payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural
product, to a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a mar-
keting board, contingent on export performance.
(b) The sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of non-
commercial stocks of agricultural products at a price lower than the compara-
ble price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market.
(c) Payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by
virtue of governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is
involved, including payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy
imposed on the agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product
from which the exported product is derived.
(d) The provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agri-
cultural products (other than widely available export promotion and advisory
services) including handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the
costs of international transport and freight.
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etary outlay and quantity commitments. Over the implementation
period (1993-1999) and taking as a base period the years 1986-1990,
budgetary outlays shall be reduced by thirty-six percent, and quantities
by twenty-four percent.278 The Contracting Parties also undertake not
to introduce or reintroduce subsidies on the export of agricultural
products if such subsidies were not granted during the base period. In
addition, they may negotiate commitments to limit the scope of export
subsidies granted on agricultural products in individual or regional
markets. 279 Note that this last provision has a strong "market share"
approach.
Annex 8 sets out the criteria according to which export competi-
tion commitments shall be determined. In connection with the prod-
uct coverage of the commitments, the document states that "outlay
and quantity commitment levels shall be established for all products or
groups of products in any case where exports of such products are sub-
sidized through practices listed in Annex 7 paragraphs (1) (a) through
(1) (e). " 280 It gives an illustrative list of such products, which include
inter alia, wheat and wheat flour, coarse grains, rice, oilseeds, vegetable
oils, oilcakes, sugar, butter and butter oil, skim milk powder, cheese,
other milk products, bovine meat, pigmeat, poultry meat, sheepmeat,
live animals, eggs, wine, fruit, vegetables, tobacco, and cotton. 281 Not
surprisingly, some of these products have been the source of much
GATT litigation in the past.
Because the document provides that commitments shall be estab-
lished for those products that are subsidized through practices listed in
Annex 7, a question arises: What if the products are subsidized
through practices other than those listed in Annex 7? The answer to
this question depends of the nature of the practice at hand. If it can
be considered a domestic subsidy, the practice will fall under the regu-
lation of "Domestic Support." If it is an export subsidy, other than those
listed in Annex 7, the answer must be found in Article 10 of the pro-
posed agreement: These subsidies "shall not be applied in a manner
which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export
subsidy commitments; nor shall non-commercial transactions be used
to circumvent such commitments."282 In addition, "participants un-
dertake not to provide export credits, export credit guarantees or in-
(e) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or
mandated by governments, on terms more favorable than for domestic
shipments.
(f) Subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in ex-
ported products.
Draft Final Act supra note 261, sec. L, art. 9 & annex 7.
278 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 11.
279 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 12 & annex 8, para. 10.
280 Draft Final Ac4 supra note 261, sec. L, annex 8, para. 7.
281 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, annex 8, para. 7.
282 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 10(1).
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surance programmes otherwise than in conformity with internationally
agreed disciplines."283
Another question posed by the proposed agreement is what hap-
pens if a Contracting Party is exporting a quantity in excess of its re-
duction commitment level and it claims that such quantity is not
subsidized. In this case, it is up to that Contracting Party to prove that
no export subsidy. (listed in Annex 7 or not) has been granted in re-
spect of such quantity.284 Note that under Article XVI(3) of the Gen-
eral Agreement (and Article 10 of the Code), if a Contracting Party
complains that another Contracting Party has acquired "more than an
equitable share of world export trade" in a product by granting export
subsidies, the burden of proof is on the claimant. According to the
proposed agreement, the burden of proof in this context now will be
born by the defendant.
Finally, the document prescribes that Contracting Parties' donors
of international food aid shall ensure that this aid is not tied directly or
indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products to recipient
countries.285 The regulation of food aid has to be welcome, bearing in
mind that a good deal of U.S. exports have taken place under the mask
of food aid.286 The loose language used in Article 10(4) casts some
doubts, however, as to whether it will be effective in preventing the
circumvention of export commitments.
Another major feature of the proposed text is the establishment of
a Committee on Agriculture, charged with the supervision of the oper-
ation of the Agreement (review function). The review process will take
place on the basis of the notifications submitted by the Contracting
Parties and documents prepared by the Secretariat.28 7 Consultations
and Dispute Settlement will be governed by Articles XXII and XXIII of
283 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 10(2). In this context, it is worth
mentioning the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Agree-
ment on Export Credits. See Agreement on Export Credit Terms, 113 OECD OBSERVER 14 (1981);
Andrew M. Moravcsik, Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement, 43 IN'r'L
ORG. 173 (1989); John E. Ray, The OECD Consensus on Export Credits, 9 WORLD ECON. 295
(1986).
284 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 10(3).
285 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 10(4) (a). In addition, these transac-
tions shall be carried out according to the FAO "Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consulta-
tive Obligations." Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 10(4) (b). When possible,
this aid shall be provided in full grant form or on terms no less concessional than those
included in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention of 1986. Draft Final Act, supra note 261,
sec. L, pt. A, art. 10(4)(c).
286 Since the enactment of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, July 10, 1954, c. 468 § 2, 68 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.), the United States undertook important Food Aid programs (e.g., Food for Peace)
directed to foster its agricultural exports. See Alexander H. Sarris, EC-US Agricultural Trade
Confrontation, in IssuEs IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS 101, 101-04 (Robert E. Baldwin et al. eds.,
1988); Ugonis & de Puiferrat, Les Relations CEE-Etats Unis: quelques aspects, 280 R.M.C. 402
(1984); David H. Nispel, Note, The Growth of U.S. Agricultural Exports: The Role of Government, 1
WIs. Irr'L L.J. 110, 116 (1982).
287 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 17.
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the General Agreement and by the new Understanding on Dispute Set-
tlement.28 8 In this context, it is to be noted that the reforms have
strengthened dramatically the judicial features of the procedure. This
can be seen, for example, in the creation of a Standing Appellate Body
composed of persons "with demonstrated expertise in law,"289 which
shall hear appeals "limited to issues of law covered in the panel report
and legal interpretation developed by the panel."290 If the proposal to
create an Integrated Dispute Settlement System goes through, some of
the traditional functions of the Code Committees in connection with
dispute settlement (establishment of panels, adoption of panel re-
ports) will be taken up by a Dispute Settlement Body.291
A third feature of the document is that it takes into account the
special problems of developing countries. Part D, for example, which
is based on Article 15 of the Agreement, encompasses a Declaration on
measures concerning the negative effects of the reform on food-im-
porting developing countries.292 Article 14(1) provides for special and
differential treatment in respect of commitments. "Least developed
countries shall not be required to undertake reduction commit-
ments."293 In addition, numerous provisions scattered throughout the
text of the Agreement provide for special and differential treatment of
these countries. 294 With respect to market access, developed countries
will take into account fully the particular needs of these countries, for
example, by providing for greater improvement of the terms of access
for agricultural products of particular interest to these countries.295
With regard to domestic support, investment subsidies and agricultural
input subsidies generally available shall be exempt from domestic sup-
port reduction commitments. This is also the case for domestic sup-
port to producers to encourage diversification from growing illicit
narcotic crops.296 In connection with export competition, developing
countries shall not be required to undertake commitments in respect
of some of the subsidies listed in Annex 7.297 With respect to specific
commitments in the areas of market access, domestic support and ex-
-288 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 18(1). See also Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes under Articles XXII and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. S, 1-23 & sec. T, 1-6;
Montafig-Mora, A GATT With Teeth, supra note 76 (commenting on the new GATT dispute
settlement procedures).
289 Draft Final Act supra note 261, sec. S, para. 15(3).
290 Draft Final Act supra note 261, sec. S, para. 15(6).
291 Draft Final Act supra note 261, sec. T, 1.
292 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. D.
293 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 15(2), & pt. B, para. 16.
294 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 13-20.
295 Draft Final Act supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 17.
296 Draft FinalAct, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 6(2) & pt. B, para. 18-19. In addition,
according to Article 6(3) if domestic support subject to reduction does not exceed 10% of
the total value of production, there shall be no requirement to undertake the reduction of
that support.
297 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 9(4) & pt. B, para. 20.
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port competition, developing countries shall have the flexibility to ap-
ply lower rates of reduction, provided that the rate of reduction in
each case is no less than two-thirds of that specified for developed
countries. In addition, they have an implementation period of ten
years. 298 As already noted, least developed countries are exempt from
the reduction commitments altogether.
Finally, the proposed Agreement on Agriculture should be re-
garded not as a point of arrival, but as the beginning of a very long
process. This is already apparent in the preamble ("Having decided to
establish a basis for initiating a process of reform. .. "),299 but is most
clearly seen in the legal pactum de negotiando included in Part XI, enti-
tled "Continuation of the Reform Process." According to the only arti-
cle of this part (Article 19), "[r]ecognizing that the long-term objective
of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection result-
ing in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, the participants
agree that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated one
year before the end of the implementation period."300 In so doing,
they shall take into account "the experience to that date in implement-
ing the reduction commitments; the effects of the reduction commit-
ments on world trade in agriculture; and what further commitments
are necessary to achieve the above mentioned long-term objectives."3 01
C. The Agreement, United States/EC: The Single Most Important
Trade Deal the World Has Ever Seen?
According to Dunkel's document, lists of specific commitments
were due on March 1, 1992.302 However, in January it was already ap-
parent that this deadline could not be met because 3 out of the 108
participants in the Uruguay Round found the proposed agreement on
Agriculture unacceptable: the EC, the United States and Japan.303
The main problem for the EC is that the Agreement on Agriculture
would undermine the foundations of the projected "new CAP." Ac-
cording to the document, the farmer income support programs envis-
aged by the reform would be subject to domestic support reduction
commitments. The United States, although closer to the principles of
the document, refused to turn its import quotas on dairy products,
sugar, peanuts, and tobacco into tariffs.30 4 The Japanese feared that
the agreement, if approved, would undermine many of the measures
designed to protect its rice production. The disagreements resulted in
a new stalemate of the negotiations.
298 Draft Final Act; supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 15.
299 Draft Final Act supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, pmbl.
300 Draft Final Act4 supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 19.
301 Draft Final Ac, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. A, art. 19.
302 Draft Final Act, supra note 261, sec. L, pt. B, para. 21.
303 See MAssoT i MA~m, EL DERE Ho AGRmaUO, supra note 212, at 722.
304 Id.
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In the fall of 1992, the United States and the EC resumed bilateral
talks in order to unlock the Round. While the United States sought a
twenty-four percent reduction in the Community's quantity of subsi-
dized exports, the latter called for no more than a eighteen percent
reduction.305 In addition, the United States pursued a dramatic reduc-
tion of Community's subsidies on oilseeds, and threatened to impose
$1 billion trade sanctions on Community products unless an accord
was reached.306 On the other hand, the EC wanted some assurance
that the direct payments to farmers introduced under the new CAP
would not be challenged.30 7
Once again, the talks revealed the deep divergences within the
Community. While most EC Member States called for a prompt ac-
cord,308 France launched diplomatic efforts to prevent the Community
from closing a deal with the United States.309 In spite of French oppo-
sition, after six years of negotiations a deal was struck on November 19,
1992. In John Major's words, it was "the single most important trade
deal the world has ever seen."310 The tentative pact would call for a
twenty-one percent reduction in the volume of farm products exported
through export subsidies, ind a thirty percent spending cut in export
subsidies during the period 1994-2000, taking as a basis the years 1986-
1990.311 In addition, the Community would undertake a reform pro-
gram to settle the long U.S./EC dispute on soybeans, which would in-
clude a limitation on oilseeds planting of 5.128 million hectares, and a
mandatory set-aside of fifteen percent of the acreage the first year, and
at least ten percent in subsequent years.312 That would leave EC pro-
duction in future years between 8.5 million and 9.7 million tons.3 13
The accord also envisaged a twenty percent cut in domestic support
during the same period, taking as a basis the years 1986-1988. With
regard to market access, the deal includes the "tariffication" of non-
tariff barriers. The resulting level of tariff equivalents would be re-
duced by thirty-six percent, using the same basis. Where there are no
significant imports, minimum access opportunities would be estab-
lished. Most importantly, the accord accepted the basic instruments of
305 Keith Bradsher, US. Hope Dashed On Global Trade, N.Y. Tims, Oct. 22, 1992, at Al,
D10.
306 Id.
307 See id.; El contencioso agrcbla vuelve a bloquear las negociaciones de EEUU. y la GEE en el
GA7T, LA VANGUARDIA, Oct. 23, 1992, at 60.
308 See Londres presiona a sus socios europeos para cerrar un acuerdo en el GATT, LA
VANGUARDIA, Oct. 25, 1992, at 78.
309 See Francia intensfica las presiones parafrenar un acuerdo del GATT, LA VANGUARDm, Oct.
26, 1992, at 49.
310 See George Brock & Martin Fletcher, Farm Deal Lifts Trade War, THE Tims (London),
Nov. 21, 1992, at 1.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
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the new CAP.314
Although it made the front page of newspapers worldwide,315 the
enthusiasm evoked by the U.S./EC accord on agriculture was soon
overshadowed by France's charge that the EC Commission had ex-
ceeded its Mandate, and by its announcement that it would prevent
the Council of Ministers from approving the agreement.3 16 Because
according to the Treaty of Rome (Article 114) trade policy decisions
are adopted by qualified majority, from a legal point of view the EC
could reach an agreement with the United States in spite of French
opposition. This move, however, would be politically unfeasible. This
episode illustrates the extent to which the capacity of the EC to speak
in international arena is curtailed by the difficulties posed by its deci-
sion-making procedures.
At the time of this writing, the 108 participants of the Uruguay
Round were still negotiating in order to complete the round that was
expected to end in December 1990. It is not surprising that the GATT
has been labeled as the "General Agreement on Talk and Talk."317 In
light of the ftndamental difficulties faced by the negotiators, two ques-
tions leap to mind: (1) Why have the negotiations lasted so long? (2)
Will there be a final deal at all?
The answer to the first question may lie in a dense web of political,
economic, ideological, strategic, and legal factors, the identification
and exposition of which fall beyond the scope of this paper. Neverthe-
less, a few considerations can be advanced here, not to answer the
question, but to provide some elements for debate. The first reason
for the delay is apparent when one looks at the agenda of the Uruguay
Round. The participants are seeking to extend the coverage of the
GATT system by including new areas such as Services, Intellectual
Property, and Trade Measures Related to Investment.318 In addition,
they are trying to include agriculture as an economic sector for the
first time under GAT coverage. These additions raise not only polit-
ical and economic issues, but also difficult technical issues. In fact, a
number of developing Contracting Parties do not have any idea about
what impact an agreement on Services would have on their economy.
In any event, if one compares the aims of the Uruguay Round and the
complexity of the issues involved with previous rounds, the delay in the
314 See Albert Massot i Marti, El Pre-Acord Agrcbla amb els Estats Units, Generalitat de Cat-
alunya, Departament d'Agricultura, Ramaderia i Pesca, Secretaria General, Gabinet T~cnic,
Desembre 1992.
315 See Brock & Fletcher, supra note 310, at 1; Phillippe Le Maitre, La France est isolie dans
son hostiliti au compromis agricole de Washington, L.E MONDE (Paris), Nov. 22-23, 1992, at 1; US.
and EC Avert Trade War with Deal on Farm Subsidies, Irr'L HERAlm TIBUNE, Nov. 21-22, 1992, at
1.
316 See Francia rechaza el acuerdo comercial entre EE.UU. y la CE LA VANGUARDIA, Nov. 21,
1992, at 1 & 49-51.
317 Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct 31, 1992, at 69.
S18 See HANDBOOK, supra note 203.
19931
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
projected agenda is hardly surprising. This complexity demanded sig-
nificant involvement of networks of knowledge-based experts, whose
ideas usually evolve independently, rather than under the direction of
domestic governments.31 9 The growing influence of groups of experts
in international cooperation has caught the attention of political scien-
tists, who have started to study the role of epistemic communities in
international policy coordination.320
Second, from a legal perspective it has been argued that the pro-
jected introduction of a "tough" dispute settlement mechanism has
brought additional strain upon the negotiations. 321 Participants in the
Uruguay Round are negotiating not only new rules, but also effective
rules. It is to be noted that one of the objectives explicitly stated in the
Declaration of Punta del Este was to "strengthen the role of GATI,
improve the multilateral trading system based on the principles and
rules of the GATT and bring about a wider coverage of world trade
under agreed, effective and enforceable multilateral disciplines."3 22
With this idea in mind, participants have introduced dramatic reforms
in the GATT dispute settlement procedure, which after the Uruguay
Round will look much like an international court.
A third factor usually overlooked by both international lawyers
and international political scientists is the importance of domestic poli-
tics.3 23 International norms do not operate in a vacuum. The process
by which they are created, adopted, implemented, and enforced de-
pends deeply on domestic factors such as the organization of domestic
pressure groups and the domestic decision-making structures within
each individual contracting party. The problems raised in connection
with the negotiations on agricultural subsidies illustrate this point.
The position of the United States is heavily conditioned by the power
of farm lobbies, but mostly by the fast-track procedure. When negotiat-
ing in the international trade arena, the U.S. Executive must always
keep an eye on Washington to make sure that the agreement reached
will be approved and implemented by Congress.
With respect to the EC, the main domestic problem when negoti-
ating international trade norms is the decision-making structure. Ac-
319 See Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order,
and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT'L ORG. 367, 374 (1992).
320 See Peter M. Haas, Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG.
(1992) (discussing the role of epistemic communities in international policy coordination in
different issue areas).
321 "One of the main reasons for the tremendous difficulties in completing the Uruguay
Round is related to the introduction of a 'tough' dispute settlement mechanism. Con-
tracting Parties take more seriously the negotiation of rules that will be judicially enforced
after the Round." Montafi'i-Mora, A GATT With Teeth, supra note 76, at 178-179.
322 See Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este, supra note 6.
323 See Milner, supra note 12, at 481. See a!SOJOHN H. JACKSON ET AL.., IMPLEMENTING THE
TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTnONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RuLEs (1984) (dis-
cussing the influence of domestic decision-making structures on international economic
norms).
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cording to Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, the negotiation of
international trade treaties is the responsibility of the EC Commission.
However, the Commission must follow the directions of the EC Coun-
cil of Ministers. In addition, the negotiated agreement requires the
latter's approval. As a consequence, trade policy decisions have to ac-
commodate the different views and interests of all member states. In
view of the evolution of the negotiations within the GATT "Agriculture
Group," it can be argued that the struggles within the Community have
been one of the most prominent causes for the delay of the round.
Most recently, the disputes between different member states as a conse-
quence of the farm deal with the United States, and its coincidence in
time with the efforts to ratify the Maastricht treaty, have slowed the
pace of the negotiations.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, many observers won-
der whether there will be a final deal at all. Although any attempt to
answer this question is a venture into the realm of speculation, it can
be argued that an agreement finally will be reached.
First, the argument usually espoused to predict a satisfactory com-
pletion of the round comes from economics. Although it has become
fashionable to argue the contrary, most economists contend that the
liberalization of world trade fostered by the eventual completion of the
Uruguay Round will result in a dramatic expansion of world trade to
the benefit of all countries. In the context of the current sluggish eco-
nomic scenario, an agreement seems a conditio sine qua non for eco-
nomic recovery. In a recent interview, the Chairman of the IMF
argued that the failure of the Uruguay Round would be the worst event
for the World since World War 11.324
The numerous advantages that the GATr legal system has
brought to the international community makes the success of the Uru-
guay Round desirable from the perspective of international law also.
Although criticized in recent years, GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures have proved to be the most effective dispute settlement system
available among all economic organizations operating on a worldwide
basis.325 By subjecting national governments to some agreed interna-
tional standards, GATT norms have created stable conditions under
which economic operators can function with certainty. "In fact, several
analysts have suggested that uncertainty may well be the single most
important trade barrier and thus its lessening, the major achievement
of the GAT." 3 26
Other arguments to predict a successful outcome for the round
come from international political scientists. Several models developed
324 See El FMI condiciona la reactivacid6n econ6mica mundial aL ixito de la Ronda Uruguay, EL
PAls (Madrid), April 24, 1992, at 61.
325 Hill, supra note 187, at 63.
326 Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 12, at 314.
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within this discipline suggest that in a GAfT-type situation, coopera-
tion .is likely to emerge. According to the Absolute Gains hypothe-
ses,327 states cooperate because they aim at realizing absolute gains.
"Following economic reasoning states act rationally to increase the net
benefits they receive."328 This is more likely to occur in an iterated
scenario such as the GATT regime. A similar hypothesis is presented
by the theory of relative gains.329 The problem with these models is
that in international trade negotiations the actors are not states but
politicians or public servants, who are constrained by various domestic
factors. "This shifts the focus from economics to politics."33 0
The International Relations discipline also argues that interna-
tional regimes are easier to maintain than to create. That is why they
are valued by governments.331 In the case of GATT', the value of the
international trade regime to governments is illustrated by the growing
number of Contracting Parties (108 at the time of writing). Notwith-
standing the problems confronted in the Uruguay Round, very few
would advocate the demise of the current regime. Were this to occur,
it would be impossible to create another international trade regime
under current conditions. As the proponents of the theory of hege-
monic stability have suggested, regimes might be maintained in the
absence of a hegemon, but they cannot be created ex-novo.332
It is one thing to forecast the round will be successfully com-
pleted, and another to predict when it will come to an end. As already
noted, the round is largely overdue. The delays are not only attributa-
ble to the problems inherent to the negotiations, but also to other fac-
tors. In this sense, U.S. elections and the problems raised in
connection with the ratification of the Maastricht accords have played
a relevant role. With regard to the problems raised by the negotia-
tions, although there have been stalemates in other sectors such as
services or textiles, agriculture topped the list. Nevertheless, one
should not be overly pessimistic. In fact, the dramatic reform of the
CAP initiated by the EC, although partially prompted by domestic fi-
nancial and political constraints, has to be read as the first success of
the agricultural trade negotiations within the Uruguay Round.
France's opposition to the deal between the United States and the
327 See, e.g., ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
328 Milner, supra note 12, at 470.
329 SeeJOSEPH M. GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS (1990). According to this the-
ory, states cooperate in order to achieve a balanced distribution of gains. See Milner, supra
note 12 (commenting on Grieco's book).
330 Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of Interna-
tional Trade, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 501, 513 (1985).
331 See KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY, supra note 14, at 50, 85-109.
332 The classical theory of hegemonic stability requires the presence of a hegemony both
for creating and for maintaining a regime. However, Keohane argues that "cooperation does
not necessarily require the existence of a hegemonic leader after international regimes have
been established." Id. at 32.
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Community does not seem insurmountable. Regimes create situations
in which issues are linked to one another. French resistance may be
overcome if the EC strikes good deals in other sectors, such as services.
In any event, whatever agreement the negotiators reach within the "Ag-
riculture Group," it will be just the point of departure of a very long
process.
VI. Conclusions
This Article has examined the compatibility of GATT with the
CAP agricultural export subsidies traditionally granted by the EC. It
has analyzed the evolution of GATY regulation of agricultural subsidies
from a historical perspective, with special emphasis on the role of the
United States and the EC in the process of development, applying one
of the newest methodologies for the study of international coopera-
tion: the combination of international relations theory with the doctri-
nal tradition of international law.
The role GATT has played in the international regulation of agri-
cultural export subsidies has varied over the years. Thus an appraisal
of the strength of the regime and the functions performed by GATT as
a regulatory framework has required an historical analysis. "Recogni-
tion of the fact that the relative importance of regime norms varies
over time it is critical for an adequate understanding of regime
evolution."333
The analysis has revealed that the agricultural export subsidies dis-
pute between the EC and the United States lends itself unfavorably to
strict legal scrutiny. A comprehensive understanding of the role of
GATT as a regulatory regime should take advantage of the broader
landscape provided by international political scientists. From this per-
spective, GATT is regarded as one of the international regimes estab-
lished after World War II characterized by formal agreements and
institutional structures. 33 4 Since the United States was in a position of
hegemony after Western Europe's decay, it modeled the basic princi-
ples of the regime after its own commercial interests. This is clearly
seen in the original regulation of the General Agreement, which left
agriculture outside the GATT to serve U.S. interests. It is also apparent
in the waiver granted to the United States in 1955 to legalize its import
restrictions and in the norms introduced in the Review Session of the
same year. In spite of the ambiguous language of the rules dealing
with agricultural export subsidies, they proved to be enforceable, as
demonstrated by the 1958 French Wheat Flour case. The outcome of
this case should be analyzed in the light of the effectiveness of GATT as
a regulatory regime during the 1950s. International political scientists
have attributed this success to the presence of a hegemony, while inter-
333 Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 12, at 305.
334 KEoHANE, AFMR HEGEMONY, supra note 14, at 139.
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national lawyers point to the strong consensus underlying the norms,
and the development of original and effective dispute settlement ma-
chinery. The interpretations are complementary.
The creation of the EC was an important challenge to the GATT
system. Firmly supported by the United States on economic and strate-
gic grounds, the Treaty of Rome itself raised some questions as to its
compatibility with the norms of the General Agreement. In any event,
the Community became a de facto member of GATT. It had to take up
the positions of its member states, this meaning that it could not shape
the regime to suit its specific interests. Over the years, the common
agricultural policy developed by the EC, especially its export refunds,
gave rise to disputes with other Contracting Parties. At the same time,
numerous developments such as the growing heterogeneity of GATT
membership and a mounting protectionism resulted in an erosion of
the system. The uneven timing between these developments and U.S.
economic decline seems to belie some of the assumptions of the theory
of hegemonic stability. The deterioration of GATT as a legal system,
coupled with the loss of credibility provoked by the 1955 U.S. agricul-
tural waiver, led to a decline in the adherence to the rules. In this
context, a strict legal analysis, as demonstrated by the EC Sugar Cases,
was unwarranted. In the late 1970s, EC practices should not have been
analyzed in terms of legality, but in terms of legitimacy.
The inability of the GATT regime to cope with the disputes raised
by agricultural subsidies skyrocketed after the Tokyo Round. During
the negotiations, and in spite of the lack of consensus, the United
States and the EC, constrained by domestic pressures, drafted new
legal rules and adopted a stringent dispute settlement mechanism.
The unresolved policy differences between the two blocks, coupled
with an historical coincidence-the greatest crisis in world agricultural
trade since the 1930s-resulted in the demise of the new dispute settle-
ment procedures, undermining the credibility of the whole GATT
legal system. The failure of the Code, as illustrated by the EC Wheat
Flour Case and what ensued, demonstrated that the solution of the
policy differences between the EC and the United States called for a
direct negotiation of their agricultural policies. In short, the key was
not only stringent regulation, but above all, negotiation. With this idea
in mind, the negotiators at the Uruguay Round, for the first time in
history, put all agricultural support measures on the negotiating table.
Although the EC, at French insistence, was very reluctant to include
agriculture within the agenda, the issue finally topped the list. In light
of the bitter disputes between the two blocks after the Ministerial Dec-
laration of 1982, and the threat of a global trade war, the final inclu-
sion of agriculture within the Uruguay negotiations may be explained
as a relative success of the tit for tat strategy. It also can be explained
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from other perspectives, such as the pressure from domestic liberal
groups within the Community to have agriculture on the table.
The deep involvement of the United States, the EC, Japan, and
the Cairns Group will legitimate GATT rules on agriculture, in the
sense that the new rules will be the result of a more balanced outcome.
An analysis of the proposed agreement reveals a triumph of economic
rationality over politics. In this sense, the growing complexity of the
issues addressed in international trade negotiations are likely to in-
crease the influence of the so-called epistemic communities in the pro-
cess of international policy coordination. In the long run, one might
envision a future in which trade relations will be less influenced by
politics and more influenced by technical expertise. At this moment,
though, if an agreement is to be reached, economic logic will have to
take into account practical political realities in some sectors. In con-
nection with agriculture, the reform of the CAP, although also fostered
by other factors, is in itself a major accomplishment of the Uruguay
Round.
The scope of the agenda, the complexity of the negotiations, and
domestic factors bearing on the negotiating ability of the most impor-
tant participants have resulted in several stalemates and a two-year de-
lay. The question now posed is whether there will be a final deal at all.
Relying on generally accepted assumptions from different disciplines,
a number of arguments have been presented to predict the successful
completion of the round. First, there is widespread agreement among
economists that the liberalization brought by the round would result in
a dramatic expansion of world trade to the benefit of all countries.
Application of several models developed by political scientists, such as
the Absolute Gains or Relative Gains hypothesis makes this argument
even more compelling. The problem with these models is that they
usually overlook domestic politics.
From a legal perspective, it has been argued that GATT norms
have contributed to the peaceful settlement of trade disputes among
states, and have provided stable conditions for world commerce. As
Petersmann has noted, "international rules increase predictability and
calculability by indicating to the international economic actors what
they can rightfully expect from others and by sanctioning non-adher-
ence to the rules."335 Conceived either as a "prototype of a legalistic
type system of international regulation,"33 6 or as a mere forum where
"trade problems are negotiated and compromised within a general
framework of rules,"33 7 most scholars recognize the tremendous bene-
335 Petersmann, International Economic Theory, supra note 38, at 257.
336 JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 5, at 252.
337 Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the Rule of Law, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1016,1017
(1985).
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fits that the GATT legal system has brought into the international
community.
Other arguments to predict the final outcome of the round have
come from the theory of international regimes. According to its pro-
ponents, regimes are much easier to maintain than to create. A failure
of the Uruguay Round would seriously damage the international trade
regime instituted after World War II. The regime has facilitated the
celebration of eight rounds of negotiations, has placed the concerns of
the developing countries in a better setting than would be the case
without the regime, and most importantly, it has ensured adherence to
its rules.
